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INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST POLICY
AND THE 1982 ACTS:
THE CONTINUING NEED
FOR REASSESSMENT
BARRY E. HAWK*
INTRODUCTION
A compeling need exists for a comprehensive reassessment of the
enforcement of the United States antitrust laws in international
trade. This need is demonstrated by the myriad of significant eco-
nomic and legal issues and the international conflicts arising out of
that enforcement. Many of the issues and conflicts are not new. But
recent economic and legal developments in international trade, and in
the position of the United States and American business within that
trade, make a reassessment particularly timely.
These changed circumstances include: the increased importance of
international trade to the United States; the decline of United States
industrial preeminence; the growing demands for a more comprehen-
sive and unified United States export policy; the exponential increase
in enforcement of foreign competition laws, particularly in Western
Europe; the increased resistance to United States enforcement that
affects foreign interests; the growing demands by developing countries
for codes governing multinationals; and last, the increased involve-
ment of United States firms with foreign governments and foreign
state-owned or mixed enterprises.
These changed circumstances have already triggered a variety of
proposals and actions, ranging from suggested minor alterations in
institutional enforcement (such as Justice Department amicus inter-
vention in private actions involving foreign commerce) to the recent
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; A.B. 1962, Fordham
University; L.L.B. 1965, University of Virginia.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Amy A. Marasco.
This article is based in part on the author's report on the Seven Springs Sympo-
sium entitled United States Antitrust Laws and Multinational Business.
1. The bodies that have put forth this potpourri of proposals include, among
others, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, the Office of the Special
Trade Representative, various sections of the American Bar Association (notably the
Antitrust Section and the International Law Section), the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, the American Law Institute, the National Association of
Manufacturers and other business groups, and international conferences (such as the
1978 Ditchley Conference). Indeed, the risk of listing here is the inadvertent exclu-
sion of prestigious groups that have proposed significant changes in U.S. antitrust
enforcement in the international area.
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legislative changes in the application of the antitrust laws in interna-
tional trade.2
Many of these proposals fail to examine sufficiently the underlying
national interests that should guide the formulation and implementa-
tion of United States antitrust policy as part of a larger United States
policy in international trade. A national commission should be estab-
lished, therefore, to provide a comprehensive and fundamental study
of United States antitrust enforcement in international trade. The
passage in October 1982 of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982, 3 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 4 in
no way moots the desirability of a commission. These Acts are narrow
in scope and address very few of the numerous issues requiring com-
mission scrutiny. Indeed, continued piecemeal change in United
States antitrust policy in international trade compels even more
strongly the establishment of a commission. This Article proposes an
agenda of items to be studied by such a commission.
I. CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE COMPREHENSIVE REASSESSMENT
A. From 1890 to 1976
In 1890 Congress paid little or no attention to the Sherman Act's5
application in international trade. Though the Act expressly applies to
restraints of United States trade "with foreign nations," the legislative
history provides no effective guidance as to either the application of
the Sherman Act in international trade or the policies and national
interests that should inform that application.6 The same ambiguity
exists with respect to subsequently enacted antitrust laws, such as the
Clayton7 and Federal Trade Commission [FTC]8 Acts, which also
apply in varying degrees to United States foreign commerce. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the history of the antitrust laws in interna-
tional trade is uneven and controversial. In 19D9 Justice Holmes nar-
rowly interpreted the Sherman Act in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.," largely limiting the Act to conduct occurring
within the United States and not involving "acts of state" of a foreign
government.10 This narrow interpretation was gradually eroded over
2. Pub. L. No. 97-290, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982).
3. Id. tit. I.4. Id. tit. IV.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
6. See Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce Under the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. Indus. Corn. L. Rev. 199, 201-02 (1977).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
9. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
10. Id. at 357.
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the years as courts expanded the application of the Sherman Act to
reach conduct occurring outside the United States and conduct involv-
ing foreign governments." This trend culminated in the 1945 Alcoa'2
decision in which Judge Learned Hand held that the Sherman Act
applies to conduct outside the United States, even when engaged in by
foreign citizens or firms, if there is both an intent to affect and an
actual effect on United States foreign commerce.' 3
During the next thirty years, courts and commentators struggled
with the intent-effect jurisdictional test of Alcoa. While couching the
test in a variety of forms, the courts were consistent in almost invari-
ably exercising jurisdiction and concluding that the Sherman Act
applied to the challenged conduct.' 4
Concurrent with this expansion of jurisdictional coverage, courts
enunciated, albeit often in dictum, substantive principles that raised
among antitrust counsellors doubts about the validity of commercially
significant arrangements such as international joint ventures,' 5 export
agreements' 6 and the world-wide operation of multinational busi-
nesses formed as wholly-owned subsidiaries in different countries. 17
During the same period, judicial statements appeared that can be
read as giving the antitrust laws and policies paramount importance
among the possible national interests existing in connection with
United States international trade. For example, the Supreme Court in
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States8 rejected the contention
that a challenged arrangement was lawful because it had a favorable
effect on United States foreign commerce.19
11. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
12. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
13. Id. at 444.
14. The Alcoa test has been reformulated in various ways; for example, courts
sometimes require a "direct" or "substantial" effect. The courts have used a variety of
verbal expressions. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597,
601 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing district court requiring a "direct and substantial
effect"); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) ("a conspiracy . . . which affects American commerce"); United States v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ("a direct and
influencing effect on trade"), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The differences among
these formulations are more apparent than real, for each signifies a legal conclusion
that the connection between the restraint and U.S. commerce is sufficient to justify a
finding of jurisdiction. Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's Antitrust
Guide for International Operations, 11 Cornell Int'l L.J. 215, 224-25 (1978).
15. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951).
16. See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 951-53
(D. Mass. 1950).
17. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
18. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
19. Id. at 599; accord United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.
Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass. 1950) (advantages to American balance of payments held
"irrelevant").
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B. The "Modern Era"
The "modern era" of United States antitrust in foreign commerce
began in 1976 with the Timberlane20 decision by Judge Choy in the
Ninth Circuit. Timberlane announced a new approach to so-called
"extraterritorial" antitrust jurisdiction, which significantly departed
from the Alcoa intent-effect test. The Timberlane court formulated a
three-part test:
Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the
foreign commerce of the United States? Is [the alleged restraint] of
such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of
the Sherman Act? As a matter of international comity and fairness,
should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be as-
serted to cover [the alleged restraint]? 2'
The heart of Timberlane is the third question, which grows out of
the court's explicit recognition of such international comity consider-
ations as respect for foreign sovereignty and foreign national interests.
The question requires the court to balance a number of factors or
interests. These include, among others, "the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties [and]
the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere. ' 22 Most of the decisions since Timberlane have
followed its balancing or comity approach with some modifications.2 3
20. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
21. Id. at 615. While Timberlane'was the first decision expressly to use a balanc-
ing approach, the idea had an almost twenty-year gestation period, dating back to
Kingman Brewster's suggestion of a "jurisdictional rule of reason." See K. Brewster,
Antitrust and American Business Abroad 446 (1958).
22. 549 F.2d at 614. The remaining factors are: "the extent to which enforce-
ment by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, . . . the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of
such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within
the United States as compared with conduct abroad." Id.
23. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp.
1161, 1187-89 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western
Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see A.G.S. Elecs., Ltd. v.
B.S.R., Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd nem., 591 F.2d 1329 (2d
Cir. 1978). The most important decision is Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), in which the Third Circuit adopted a two-step
approach under which the court first decides whether "jurisdiction" exists and sec-
ond, whether that jurisdiction should be exercised in the light of comity consider-
ations. Id. at 1292, 1296. The court specified 10 factors that should be weighed in
analyzing the comity issue because the "individual interests and policies of each of the
foreign nations differ and must be balanced against our nation's legitimate interest in
regulating anticompetitive activity." Id. at 1298. Despite the strong trend toward a
balancing approach and its apparently greater sensitivity to foreign interests, it
remains to be seen whether the results on the jurisdictional issue will change. Indeed,
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At first glance the Timberlane balancing approach, given its
greater explicit sensitivity to foreign interests and its potential for
narrowing antitrust jurisdiction, provides hope that it might resolve or
mitigate some of the problems arising in connection with the applica-
tion of United States antitrust laws in international trade. Any adverse
impact on United States export trade, for example, might be reduced
by the narrowing of jurisdiction. The Timberlane approach might
also lessen conflicts with foreign nations. But as seen below, 24 this
optimism may be misplaced and it remains to be seen whether Tim-
berlane and its progeny will be successful in furthering international
harmony in the antitrust world. The courts that have adopted a
Timberlane approach are inconsistent both in their laundry list of
factors to be balanced2 5 and in their balancing of those factors.2 6 This
raises serious questions whether the Timberlane approach, or any
conflict of laws approach, has the requisite specificity to ensure coun-
selability and principled decisions.
C. The Changed Circumstances of the Present Day
The decisions constituting the highwater mark of antitrust enforce-
ment in United States f6reign commerce-Alcoa,2 7 Timken 28 and
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.29-were
U.S. courts are continuing to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982); Daishowa Int'l v. North
Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774, at 71,789-90 (N.D. Cal.
1982). This raises the question whether U.S. courts are realistically in a position to
"balance" in favor of foreign interests and against enforcement of the U.S. antitrust
laws. Moreover, not all courts have adopted Timberlane. E.g., National Bank of
Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1981).
An approach similar to Timberlane is taken in the Second Tentative Draft of the
revised Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) §§ 402-403, 415 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1981).
24. See infra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 23.
26. For example, the Seventh Circuit in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617
F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), while purporting to adopt a Timberlane balancing
approach, failed to look to the kinds of comity factors enumerated in Timberlane and
Mannington Mills. In a not overly pellucid opinion, the court exercised jurisdiction
over nine foreign defendants who had defaulted by failing to appear. The court cited
three factors: 1) complexity of the action; 2) seriousness of the charges; and 3)
recalcitrance of the defaulting defendants. Id. at 1255. Despite the references to
Timberlane and Mannington Mills, it is difficult to understand how these three
factors either fall within the approaches of those decisions or can be considered part
of a comity approach. The aberrant approach taken in Uranium may be explained by
the default judgment aspect of the case.
27. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
28. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
29. 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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rendered in a period of domestic and international circumstances far
different from those of today. These changed circumstances compel a
reassessment of United States international antitrust policy.
1. The Dramatically Increased Importance of
International Trade to the United States
Imports such as automobiles and consumer electronic equipment
now constitute a sizable percentage of the market in many indus-
tries.30 Export of goods and services also constitutes an important and
increasing proportion of the United States economy. This "interna-
tionalization" of the United States economy contrasts vividly with the
relatively isolated trade position of the United States in 1890 and
before World War II. It can be seen in both seller and buyer markets.
For example, economies of scale in the aircraft industry dictate that
United States suppliers not only face competition from foreign com-
petitors but also negotiate with powerful foreign buyers.
2. The Relative Decline of United States Industrial
Preeminence in the World
Neither the United States economy in the aggregate nor United
States-based firms generally enjoy the high share of participation and
power in markets that they enjoyed in the years immediately follow-
ing World War II.31 Thus, while international trade is becoming more
important to the United States and United States-based firms, these
firms face increasing foreign competition in both domestic and foreign
markets. The implications of just these two changed circumstances on
United States international economic policy in general, and on anti-
trust policy in particular, are enormously significant. For example,
analysis of geographic and product markets might place greater em-
phasis on the growing importance of foreign competition, 32 and the
30. See I. Magaziner & R. Reich, Minding America's Business: The Decline and
Rise of the American Economy 29-39 (1982).
31. See Subcomm. on Int'l Fin., Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on U.S. Export Policy 1-2, 6-8 (Comm.
Print 1979).
32. This might be accomplished by including some foreign production in the
relevant market. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 937, 965-67 (1981). For criticisms of Landes & Posner's analysis, see Sympo-
sium, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (1982).
The Justice Department in its new Merger Guidelines recognizes that geographic
market definition may differ in the international trade context. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Merger Guidelines, reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4502, at 6881-10 to -11
(Aug. 9, 1982). Although the guidelines do not announce any special rules with
respect to international mergers, they do caution that:
In general, the standards stated above will govern geographic market
definition, whether domestic or international. The Department, however,
[Vol. 51
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operation of per se rules of illegality might give way to the more
lenient rules of reason. 33
3. The Significant Increase in Enforcement
of Foreign Competition Laws
West Germany 34 and the European Economic Community [EEC or
Common Market]35 now have broad pro-competition regimes.3 1 Com-
petition laws also exist on the books of many other countries, 37 al-
though they are enforced far less vigorously. The implications of this
increase in foreign enforcement on United States antitrust policy are
not entirely clear. Greater foreign surveillance of restrictive and mo-
nopolistic practices arguably permits a relaxation of United States
antitrust enforcement in international trade. Foreign antitrust en-
forcement may also indicate 'a growing international convergence of
views with respect to restrictive practices and monopolistic conduct by
private firms operating within the domestic market of the enforcing
country. To the extent that such an international convergence is tak-
ing place, it might reduce some of the conflicts engendered by zealous
enforcement of the United States antitrust laws in international trade.
will be somewhat more cautious, both in expanding market boundaries
beyond the United States and in assessing the likely supply response of
specific foreign firms. Although firms located outside the United States may
exert an important competitive influence on domestic prices, they may be
subject to additional constraints not present in the purely domestic context.
For example, changes in exchange rates, tariffs, and general political condi-
tions may limit the ability of such firms to respond to domestic price
increases.
Id. at 6881-11.
33. Members of a Business Advisory Panel to the 1978 National Commission
made a similar suggestion in connection with the Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
61-66 (1976). Nat'l Comm'n for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures,
Report to the President and the Attorney General 295 (1979).
34. See generally Unit B [Vol. 5] K. Stockman & V. Strauch, World Law of
Competition (J. von Kalinowski gen. ed. 1979).
35. See generally B. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International
Antitrust: A Comparative Guide (1979).
36. The significant increase in enforcement is particularly notable in Western
Europe. See generally Unit B, World Law of Competition (J. von Kalinowski gen.
ed. 1979); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD],
Annual Reports on Competition Policy in OECD Member Countries (1977).
37. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] has
begun preparing annual summaries of antitrust developments in member countries.
See, e.g., UNCTAD Annual Report 1981 on Legislative and other Developments in
Developed and Developing Countries in the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/RBP/9 (1982).
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4. The Increasingly Hostile Foreign Reaction to
Recent United States Antitrust Efforts
Hostile reaction to United States antitrust enforcement efforts is not
new; diplomatic protests and strong foreign government objections
have occurred in the past. 38 What is new, and potentially far more
troublesome, is the resort by foreign governments to "blocking" legis-
lation and "claw back" provisions, which are intended to deter or
block United States antitrust investigations and actions involving for-
eign parties and/or governments, 39 particularly when the challenged
conduct takes place outside United States territory and, most impor-
tantly, within the territory of the objecting foreign government. 40
Australia, 41 Canada, 42 France, 43 the Netherlands, 44 and the United
38. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. Justice Department enforce-
ment is active in the shipping area and has caused considerable international contro-
versy. Following an extensive investigation of liner conferences in U.S. trade, the
Justice Department in 1979 brought indictments under section 1 of the Sherman Act
against seven major European and U.S. ocean carriers and 13 of their executives. In
re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The
district court imposed fines of $6.1 million against the defendants pursuant to plea
agreements, the largest settlement ever in a criminal case under the Sherman Act. B.
Hawk, supra note 35, at 4 & n.48-2 (Supp. 1981). The shipping indictments
prompted the British government to enact the Protection of Trading Interests Act,
1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at
F-1 (Apr. 10, 1980). As seen below, this Act blocks discovery and limits enforcement
of judgments. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
Despite this strong foreign adverse reaction, the Justice Department has continued
its antitrust efforts. In June 1980 it demanded documents from one U.S. and six
foreign shipping lines in connection with container trade between the United States
and Australia and New Zealand. The investigation has resulted in several decisions
involving discovery requests by both the Justice Department and the carriers in-
volved. See, e.g., Australia/Eastern U.S.A. Shipping Conference v. United States,
1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,943 (D.D.C. 1981); Associated Container Transp.
(Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
39. See generally Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of
Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50
Fordham L. Rev. 877 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Compelling Production].
40. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
41. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976 Austl. Acts
1125, amended by 1976 Austl. Acts 1743.
42. Uranium Information Security Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 76-644
(1976), amended by Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 77-836 (1977).
43. Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial,
Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons, 1980 Journal Officiel de la R6publique Franpaise Recueil Dalloz [J.O.]
1799, 1980 Bulletin l~gislatif Dalloz [B.L.D.] 285 (English translation at 75 Am. J.
Int'l L. 382 (1981)).
44. Economic Competition Act, 1956 Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Ne-
derlanden [Stb.] 401, amended by Act of July 16, 1958, Stb. 413 (English translation
at 5 OECD, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices 1, 18-19 (June
[Vol. 51
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Kingdom, 45 among others, 46 now have statutes that block enforcement
of United States pretrial orders to produce documents and/or obtain
information in antitrust actions. For example, France has made it a
criminal offense to seek or disclose information that "would threaten
the sovereignty, security, or essential economic interests of France or
public order. 47
The British Protection of Trading Interests Act 8 goes further than
any of the other "blocking" statutes. Its now notorious "claw back"
provision creates a cause of action in the British courts for recovery of
the punitive portion of a foreign multiple damage judgment (e.g.,
private treble damages under United States antitrust laws) under
certain conditions, notably when the non-British judgment concerned
1972)); see Smit, International Aspects of American and Netherlands Antitrust Legis-
lation, 5 Neth. Int'l L. Rev. 274 (1958).
45. The British provisions were formerly found in the Shipping Contracts and
Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87. In 1980 more comprehensive blocking
legislation was enacted in the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11,
reprinted in [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-1 (Apr.
10, 1980). The British statute was enacted in reaction to a 1960 investigation of
multinational shipping conferences. See generally In re Grand Jury Investigation of
the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960) (investigation of ocean ship-
ping industry for possible antitrust violations).
46. The Business Records Protection Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 54 (1970) (Ontario),
was passed in reaction to subpoenas issued to several Canadian" paper and pulp
companies by a New York grand jury. See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1947), discussed in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522, 529 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Comment, Judicial Cooperation in the Taking of Evidence
Abroad-The Canada and Ontario Evidence Acts, 8 Tex. Int'l L.J. 57 (1973).
Legislation has also been enacted in Quebec, South Africa and West Germany.
Business Concerns Records Act, Que. Rev. Stat. ch. 278 (1964); Atomic Energy Act,
1967, No. 90, § 30A, amended by Atomic Energy Amendment Act, 1978, No. 46 (S.
Afr.); Lav of May 24, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGB 2] 833 (W. Ger.).
47. Law Relating to the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial
or Financial or Technical Documents or Information to Foreign Natural or Legal
Persons, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980 B.L.D. 285 (English translation at 75 Am. J. Int'l L.
382 (1981)).
One French official has taken the position that the primary purpose of the 1980
amendment was to ensure that foreign counsel comply with the judicially-supervised
French discovery procedures rather than to block production of documents. See
Address by G. Guillaume, Director of Legal Affairs of the French Ministry of
External Affairs, Chambre de Commerce Internationale, Paris (Apr. 1981) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review); see also Advisory Opinion of the French Ministry of
Justice, 1981 J.O. 373 Question 35.893. For a summary of the French legislation, see
Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 15 Int'l Law. 585 (1981).
48. 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 959, at F-1 (Apr. 10, 1980).
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activities outside the enforcing nation's territory (e.g., "extraterritor-
ial" jurisdiction under the United States antitrust laws) .4
49. Section 6 provides:
(1) This section applies where a court of an overseas country has given a
judgment for multiple damages within the meaning of section 5 (3) above
against-
(a) a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies; or
(b) a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom or in a terri-
tory outside the United Kingdom for whose international relations Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible; or
(c) a person carrying on business in the United Kingdom,
(in this section referred to as a "qualifying defendant") and an amount on
account of the damages has been paid by the qualifying defendant either to
the party in whose favour the judgment was given or to another party who
is entitled as against the qualifying defendant to contribution in respect of
the damages.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, the qualifying defendant
shall be entitled to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment
was given so much of the amount referred to in subsection (1) above as
exceeds the part attributable to compensation; and that part shall be taken
to be such part of the amount as bears to the whole of it the same proportion
as the sum assessed by the court that gave the judgment as compensation for
the loss or damage sustained by that party bears to the whole of the damages
awarded to that party.
(3) Subsection (2) above does not apply where the qualifying defendant is
an individual who was ordinarily resident in the overseas country at the
time when the proceedings in which the judgment was given were instituted
or a body corporate which had its principal place of business there at that
time.
(4) Subsection (2) above does not apply where the qualifying defendant
carried on business in the overseas country and the proceedings in which the
judgment was given were concerned with activities exclusively carried on in
that country.
(5) A court in the United Kingdom may entertain proceedings on a claim
under this section notwithstanding that the person against whom the pro-
ceedings are brought is not within the jurisdiction of the court.
(6) The reference in subsection (1) above to an amount paid by the
qualifying defendant includes a reference to an amount obtained by execu-
tion against his property or against the property of a company which
(directly or indirectly) is wholly owned by him; and references in that
subsection and subsection (2) above to the party in whose favour the judg-
ment was given or to a party entitled to contribution include references to
any person in whom the rights of any such party have become vested by
succession or assignment or otherwise.
(7) This section shall, with the necessary modifications, apply also in
relation to any order which is made by a tribunal or authority of an overseas
country and would, if that tribunal or authority were a court, be a judg-
ment for multiple damages within the meaning of section 5 (3) above.
(8) This section does not apply to any judgment given or order made
before the passing of this Act.
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6, reprinted in [Jan.-June]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 959, at F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980).
[Vol. 51
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The British claw back provision and the recent enactment or
strengthening of blocking statutes in other nations reflect the serious
foreign concern with United States antitrust enforcement in interna-
tional trade when that enforcement touches on the interests of foreign
nations. Resolution of these conflicts with foreign nations is an impor-
tant item on any agenda to reassess United States antitrust enforce-
ment. 10 While the recent cooperation agreement between the United
States and Australia 5' offers some hope that discovery conflicts can be
50. A commentator has suggested recently the following approach to resolving
discovery conflicts:
First, the court should determine that an actual conflict with the nondisclo-
sure law exists. . . . Second, the court should employ letters rogatory to
enlist the aid of the foreign government in securing the documents....
If the foreign nation declines to enforce the letters rogatory, the court must
then decide whether to compel production. Three basic principles should
guide the court's inquiry: (1) that nondisclosure [or blocking statutes) often
are designed to protect legitimate foreign policies which are deserving of
judicial respect; (2) that it should not lightly compel acts that violate the
laws of another country; and (3) that its assertion of enforcement jurisdic-
tion must be based on reasonableness. With these principles guiding the
inquiry, the court should consider the following five factors:
(1) Importance of the documents to the resolution of key issues in the
litigation ....
(2) Alternative means of obtaining the information contained in the
documents ....
(3) Importance of the underlying interests ....
(4) Identity of the party resisting production ....
(5) Where the acts giving rise to the cause of action occurred.
Compelling Production, supra note 39, at 903-06 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
51. In 1982 the United States and Australia entered into a bilateral agreement
which provides for consultation and cooperation with respect to discovery and other
antitrust enforcement matters. The Australian Government agreed not to block
automatically compliance by Australian firms with subpoenas from U.S. agencies
and private litigants. The relevant provisions follow:
ARTICLE 5
Cooperation in Antitrust Enforcement
1. When a proposed investigation or enforcement action under the anti-
trust laws of one nation does not adversely affect the laws, policies or
national interests of the other, each Party shall cooperate with the other in
regard to that investigation or action, including through the provision of
information and administrative and judicial assistance to the extent permit-
ted by applicable national law.
2. The mere seeking by legal process of information or documents located
in its territory shall not in itself be regarded by either Party as affecting
adversely its significant national interests, or as constituting a basis for
applying measures to prohibit the transmission of such information or docu-
ments to the authorities of the other Party, provided that in the case of
United States legal process prior notice has been given of its issuance. Each
Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances of the
particular case, provide notice to the other before taking action to prevent
compliance with such legal process.
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moderated in the future, these conflicts will continue and they remain
a suitable subject for commission study.
5. The Growing Demand by Developing Countries for
International Regulation of Restrictive Business
Practices, Monopolies and Multinational Firms
Developing countries have been motivated in their demand for
international regulation not so much by traditional antitrust concerns
as by concerns about the economic, social and political power of
multinationals and by a desire to transfer technology on more favor-
able terms than have existed in the past. 2 Many of these demands are
based, in whole or in part, on economic and social considerations
inconsistent with the premises and goals underlying American anti-
trust enforcement. Partially in response to these demands, the indus-
trialized nations comprising the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development [OECD] in 1976 adopted Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, which contain provisions on restraints of
trade and monopoly abuses. 53
The United Nations has become the chief forum for the presenta-
tion of developing countries' demands. In 1980, after several years of
deliberations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment [UNCTAD] adopted a Restrictive Business Practices Code.,4 The
UNCTAD Code, entitled "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,"
was subsequently approved by the United Nations General Assem-
bly.55
The Code is a set of voluntary guidelines. In general, it exhorts
firms to refrain from engaging in restrictive agreements and from
abusing a dominant position of market power. The Code is to be
applied on a non-discriminatory basis to all enterprises whether
multinational or domestic and whether private or state-owned. It
Agreement Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, reprinted in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1071, at 36 (July 1, 1982).
52. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 14.
53. Annex to the OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises, OECD Doe. 21 (76) 04/1 (1976), reprinted in Inst. for Int'l and
Foreign Trade Law, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: A Busi-
ness Appraisal 252 (1977). See generally Hawk, The OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises: Competition, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 241 (1977).
54. UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10
(1980).
55. G.A. Res. 35/63, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 123, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1980). For the text of the Code and a critique of its provisions, see B. Hawk, supra
note 35, ch. 14.
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generally does not apply, however, to transactions between affiliated
members of a single multinational firm. The Code recognizes the need
to promote the establishment and development of domestic industries
in developing countries and to encourage the economic development
of these nations. Although the Code is drafted in traditional antitrust
language, 56 non-competition and protectionist policies underlie the
developing countries' approval of the Code. The Code's implications
for United States antitrust policy are as yet unclear. Commission
review of the UNCTAD Code and of the proposed UNCTAD Code on
Technology Transfers, 57 against the more general background of
United States antitrust enforcement in international trade, is neces-
sary.
6. The Increased Commercial Role of
Foreign Governments and State-Controlled Instrumentalities
in International Trade
The mercantilist element differentiates international trade from
United States domestic trade. The domestic market is largely free
from the kinds and degrees of mercantilism seen in international
trade. This difference in the conditions of trade may require that
different substantive antitrust rules should apply in international
trade. For example, antitrust rules governing predatory pricing and
other forms of predation by foreign competitors should perhaps differ
significantly from those applied to domestic predators. 58
Given the increase in foreign government participation in interna-
tional trade, private plaintiffs, not surprisingly, have begun to chal-
lenge foreign government or mixed conduct under the antitrust laws.
One example is the action in which a United States manufacturer of
golf carts alleged that a state-owned Polish manufacturer of compet-
ing carts violated the antitrust laws by offering carts at subsidized
prices in the United States lower than plaintiffs prices. 59 Another
example is the unsuccessful action by a United States trade union
against OPEC and its member states for price fixing.60 United States
government and private challenges to foreign government interven-
tion in the potash and uranium markets have resulted in acrimonious
conflicts with trading partners. The increased frequency and com-
56. The Code is not entirely consistent, however, with either U.S. or Western
European antitrust law.
57. UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technol-
ogy, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (1981).
58. See infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
59. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978). For
further details, see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
60. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1036 (1982).
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plexity of dealings between foreign governments and private business
also raise numerous issues concerning the antitrust liability of those
private firms in connection with foreign government involvement.
These issues concern primarily the act of state doctrine,6 1 the foreign
sovereign compulsion defense 62 and the application abroad of the
,Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 63
Until these legal issues are more precisely delineated and resolved,
American firms dealing with foreign governments will continue to
incur significant antitrust exposure. To cite but one example, the
compulsion defense under American antitrust law may be overly rigid
in its requirement of government "compulsion." Indeed, the very
requirement could actually increase foreign government intervention
in the marketplace.
Resolution of the many legal issues surrounding foreign government
involvement in international trade would be enhanced by placing
those issues in the broader relevant context of foreign government
involvement rather than continuing the present judicial practice of
61. The classic formulation of the doctrine was set forth in Underhill v. Hernan-
dez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252; see, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1976); First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 762-63 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-20
(1964); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977).
62. This defense precludes antitrust liability for private conduct compelled by a
foreign government. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690, 706-08 (1962); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597,
606 (9th Cir. 1976); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
63. This doctrine derives primarily from three decisions, California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and protects the collective exercise of the
right of political expression from Sherman Act liability, even when such "[j]oint
efforts to influence public officials," 381 U.S. at 670, are anticompetitive. The
Supreme Court's decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) is usually proffered as the basis for application of Noerr-
Pennington abroad. Several lower courts have rejected this extension. See Associated
Container Transp. Ltd. v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 505, 507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), af'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972). The Justice Department in the International Antitrust Guide takes the posi-
tion that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does apply abroad. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Guide on Antitrust and International Operations Case N, reprinted in Trade Reg.
Reports (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 61-62 (Feb. 1, 1977).
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isolated adjudication of each doctrine or defense. A commission would
be ideally suited to conduct a broad inquiry sensitive to the interre-
lated aspects of each doctrine or defense.
II. THE 1982 Acrs
The last several years have witnessed a proliferation of bills to
amend the antitrust laws as applied in international trade. 4 In 1979
Senators Javits and Mathias, 65 and again in 1981 Senator Mathias, 66
proposed legislation to create a national commission to study antitrust
enforcement in international trade. While most of the proposed bills
remain pending, on October 8, 1982 President Reagan signed into law
a major piece of legislation17 consisting of the Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 19828 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1982.9 As seen below, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
64. For example, two pending Senate bills would strengthen the 1916 Antidump-
ing Act, which makes it unlawful "commonly and systematically" to dump articles
into the United States "with the intent" of 1) destroying or injuring an industry in the
U.S., 2) preventing the establishment of an industry in the U.S., or 3) restraining or
monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the U.S. 15 U.S.C.
§ 72 (1976). The bills would eliminate the need to prove that-an importer intended to
injure U.S. markets and would make dumpers liable for treble damages by making
dumping an antitrust offense, enforceable by private action. S. 2517, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982); S. 2167, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
The International Rule of Law Act would limit the act of state doctrine, and
would allow U.S. courts to hear cases alleging that the foreign government act in
question violates international law. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
The Pfizer bills would amend the Clayton Act to prevent a foreign government or
an instrumentality of a foreign government from maintaining a civil action except
under certain conditions. S. 816, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2812, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
65. S. 1010, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
66. S. 432, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
67. Pub. L. No. 97-290, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982).
68. Id. tits. I-III. Although title II of the new legislation is separately entitled the
"Bank Export Services Act," this Article will treat title II, as well as title III, as part
of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982. Titles I, II and III derive from the same
Senate Banking Committee bill, the Export Trading Company Act of 1981, S. 734,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), which permitted the establishment of export trading
companies by banks and other firms and provided a partial antitrust exemption for
their operations.
69. Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982). The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 largely derives from a House Judiciary Committee bill, H. 5235, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982), which amended the foreign commerce jurisdictional provisions of the
Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts. For an analysis of earlier versions of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, see Garvey, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1981, 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1 (1982).
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Act is broader in scope, and perhaps greater in its antitrust signifi-
cance, than the Export Trading Company Act.
A. Export Trading Company Act of 1982
Title I of the Export Trading Company Act lists eleven Congres-
sional "findings" relating to the importance of export trade to the
American economy and states that the Act's purpose is to "increase
United States exports of products and services by encouraging more
efficient provision of export trade services to United States producers
and suppliers. ' 70 Title I also establishes an "office of export trade"
within the Department of Commerce to promote the formation of
trading companies and associations. 71 Finally, Title I is broader than
the Webb-Pomerene Act7 2 exemption for export cartels, for Title I
defines "export trade" to include the exportation of services as well as
goods.7 3
Title II, separately entitled the "Bank Export Services Act," pro-
vides financing incentives to encourage the formation of export trad-
ing companies and the participation of banks in those companies by
amending the banking laws to reduce restrictions on trade financing
provided by financial institutions. 74
Title III establishes a new certification procedure under which the
Secretary of Commerce has the power to grant an exemption certifi-
cate of review to export trading companies that meet specified crite-
ria.75 This exemption supplements and does not replace the existing
Webb-Pomerene exemption. An application received by the Com-
merce Department will be forwarded to the Justice Department
within seven days of its receipt. Within 90 days the Secretary of
Commerce, with the concurrence of the Justice Department, will
issue a certificate if the applicant's activities would:
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or
restraint of trade within the United States nor a substantial re-
straint of the export trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within
the United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of
the class exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against com-
petitors engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or
services of the class exported by the applicant, arid
70. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 102(b), [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982).
71. Id. § 104.
72. The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 exempts export cartels from the Sherman
Act under certain limited conditions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976); see B. Hawk, supra
note 35, at 96-111.
73. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 103(a)(1), [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982).
74. Id. tit. 3.75. Id. § 303(a).
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(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to
result in the sale for consumption or resale within the United States
of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services exported by the appli-
cant.
76
The certificate shall specify:
(1) the export trade, export trade activities, and methods of
operation to which the certificate applies,
(2) the person to whom the certificate of review is issued, and
(3) any terms and conditions the Secretary or the Attorney Gen-
eral deems necessary to assure compliance with the standards of
[section 303(a)]. 77
The Commerce Department, with the concurrence of the Justice De-
partment, is empowered to issue guidelines describing specific types of
conduct falling within the section 303(a) standards.7
Certificates may be revoked or modified when either the Com-
merce or the Justice Department determines that, among other things,
the export trade, export trade activities or methods of operation of a
certificate holder no longer comply with the standards set forth in
section 303(a).79 Annual reports must be submitted to the Commerce
Department by certificate holders.8 0
A certificate also provides a limited exemption from the antitrust
laws. Private actions by injured parties for injunctive relief and single
damages only may be brought for failure to comply with the section
303(a) standards, which are the exclusive standards in the action.,
Disincentives to private actions are provided, however. For example,
the burden of proof is greater because conduct that is specified in and
complied with in a certificate presumptively complies with the section
303(a) standards.8 2 Further, attorney's fees and costs will be assessed
against unsuccessful plaintiffs.8 3
The Commerce Department, with the concurrence of the Justice
Department, is empowered to issue rules and regulations necessary
under the Act. 4 Sections 302 and 303, concerning the application and
issuance of certificates, will not take effect until 90 days after the
effective date of the first rules and regulations.8 5
76. Id.
77. Id. § 303(b).
78. Id. § 307.
79. Id. § 304.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 306(b)(1).
82. Id. § 306(b)(3).
83. Id. § 306(b)(4).
84. Id. § 310.
85. Id. § 312(b).
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Several aspects of the Export Trading Company Act merit special
attention. First, the Justice Department will continue to play an
active role through its participation in the certification process and its
investigatory power over export trading companies.86 The Federal
Trade Commission, which has jurisdiction over Webb-Pomerene asso-
ciations, has been supplemented by the Commerce Department. 87
Second, while the thrust of the Act is to provide an exemption broader
than the Webb-Pomerene Act exemption, the Act expands antitrust
coverage in one respect-the creation of a private claim against export
competitors 8 for "unfair methods of competition. '89 Moreover, the
four conditions or standards for certification set forth in section 303(a)
may actually be more stringent than the statutory conditions under
the Webb-Pomerene Act. For example, the third and fourth standards
in section 303(a) (unfair methods of competition and the sale or resale
of the exported goods in the United States) seem to go beyond the
statutory conditions set forth in the Webb-Pomerene Act.90 Third, the
certification procedure has been criticized as "cumbersome" and a
potential "deterrent" to small and medium-sized companies that wish
to engage in joint export activity.91 The procedure will require com-
panies to disclose sensitive information to the government and may
require undesirable expenditures of firm time and money. In addi-
tion, the terms of the certificate may not be flexible enough for the
company to face unforeseen market changes.
The principal question, of course, is whether the Export Trading
Company Act will succeed in increasing United States exports. In
answering that question, a distinction must be made between the
banking or financial aspects of the Act and the antitrust aspects. The
Act primarily concerns the participation of banks in export trading
companies. The antitrust provisions are secondary and were included
86. Id. § 304(b)(3).
87. Id. § 301.
88. Id. § 306(b)(1).
89. Id. § 303(a)(3). Section 5 of the FTC Act also prohibits "unfair methods of
competition," but it does not provide a private right of action. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1976).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976); B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 97.
91. E.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 144 Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-44 (1981) (statement of Ky P.
Ewing, Jr.); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on S. 795 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-93 (1981) (statement of
A. Paul Victor); see also 127 Cong. Rec. H779 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1981) (remarks of
Reps. Rodino and McClory). Similarly, the EEC exemption procedure has been
heavily criticized on a number of procedural and substantive grounds. The Commis-
sion itself recognizes some of the defects and is moving to correct some of them. See
Comm'n of the European Communities, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy 27-
28 (1982). See generally B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 8.
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to meet a legislative perception that the antitrust laws have been
inhibiting the formation of export trading companies and thus have
been inhibiting exports.92 Whether this perception is well-based is
itself questionable. If it is not, then the antitrust provisions in the
Export Trading Company Act may not significantly change the
United States export picture. Indeed, if the history of the Webb-
Pomerene Act provides any guidance, it is doubtful that exports will
surge as a result of the apparently broader antitrust exemption and
cumbersome certification procedure in the 1982 Act. The Act may
defuse, however, some of the controversy about antitrust's asserted
adverse impact on American business in international trade. But, as
seen below, numerous and significant issues remain with respect not
only to the impact issue but more importantly to other international
antitrust issues that should be studied by a commission. Thus, the
Export Trading Company Act does not moot the need for a national
commission.
B. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 incorpo-
rates two sections of H.R. 5235, which took a so-called "generic"
approach to amending the antitrust laws. The Sherman Act and
section 5(a) of the FTC Act are amended directly,93 as contrasted with
the indirect approach taken by the Export Trading Company Act,
which establishes an antitrust exemption in addition to the Webb-
Pomerene Act exemption for export cartels. Like the Export Trading
Company Act, however, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act deals only with jurisdiction over United States export transactions
and purely foreign transactions. The Act is not intended to affect
jurisdiction with respect to import transactions.9 4 The Act amends the
broad and general jurisdictional provisions of the Sherman Act and
section 5 of the FTC Act by inserting specific language requiring, as a
jurisdictional threshold, a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able" effect on United States domestic commerce or on the export
commerce of a United States resident.9 5 In the latter case, the acts
apply to conduct only for injury to export business in the United
States.9 " Accordingly, the Sherman Act is amended to provide that:
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations
unless-
92. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
93. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
94. H.R. Report No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1982).
95. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
96. Id.
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"(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect-
"(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
"(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States;
and
"(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this
Act, other than this section.
"If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of
paragraph (1) (B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for
injury to export business in the United States. 97
It is essential to keep in mind that this Act, like the Export Trading
Company Act, arose from a congressional desire to facilitate United
States exports. 98 Thus, the Act is carefully drafted to affect jurisdiction
only over conduct primarily involving exports. Importantly, the Act is
not intended to affect jurisdiction over foreign conduct affecting im-
ports into the United States. The Sherman Act's application to United
States and foreign participation in international cartels remains un-
changed, as the House Report expressly recognizes.9 9 The Act, there-
fore, is not as sweeping as it first might appear. It does resolve the
debate in the literature whether the Sherman Act applies to alleged
restraints on exports that have harmful competitive effects only in
foreign markets; for example, the fixing by United States exporters of
a common price through a joint sales agency for goods sold only in a
97. Id.
Section 403 amends section 5 (a) of the FTC Act and provides:
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
"(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition
involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce)
unless-
"(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable effect-
"(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations, or on
important commerce with foreign nations, or
"(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in
such commerce in the United States; and
"(B) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this subsec-
tion, other than this paragraph.
If this subsection applies to such methods of competition only because of the
operation of subparagraph (A)(ii), this subsection shall apply to such con-
duct only for injury to export business in the United States."
Id. § 403.
98. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.(1982).
99. Id. at 13.
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foreign market. 100 The Act resolves the issue in the negative, unless
there is an adverse effect on the export business of a United States
resident. Without such an adverse effect on United States firms, the
Sherman and FTC Acts do not apply.' 0' With one qualification, this
result is consistent with the case law 0 2 and with the International
Antitrust Guidelines.10 3 The Act does change the existing case law in
the following respect. Courts have upheld Sherman Act jurisdiction
once foreclosure of United States exporters has been established even
though the plaintiff is not a United States exporter but a foreign firm
seeking to recover damages incurred in a foreign market. 0 4 The Act
expressly precludes such recovery by limiting the claim to "injury to
export business in the United States."'10 5
Interestingly enough, the conference committee dropped a section
in the earlier bill (H.R. 5235), which had provided that section 7 of
the Clayton Act does not apply to foreign joint ventures. 10 The Act
does not clarify, therefore, the many issues surrounding the applica-
tion of section 7 to foreign joint ventures. 1"
Analysis of the new specific "effect" test in the Act is beyond the
scope of this Article. Several preliminary observations are offered,
however. First, the addition of the adjectives "direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable"'1 8 probably adds little practical guidance in
100. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 46-51. Compare Address by D. Rosenthal,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in U.S. Export Trade, before the American Soc'y of Int'l
L. (Apr. 23, 1977) (Sherman Act does not apply when effects are only in foreign
markets), partially reprinted in American Soc'y of Int'l L., Proceedings of the 71st
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 214, 215 (1977) with
Rahl, A Rejoinder, 8 Cornell Int'l L.J. 42 (1974) (Sherman Act may apply when
effects are only in foreign markets).
101. See Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Beg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
102. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enters., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,378
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and
Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 383 F. Supp. 586
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
103. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and International Operations
(1977), reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 7 (Feb. 1, 1977).
104. See Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and Eng'g
Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,256, at 70,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
105. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982). The House Report is not entirely unambiguous. See
H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1982).
106. Compare H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982) (amending § 7 of
Clayton Act) with Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402 (retaining § 7 of Clayton Act), [July-
Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
107. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 3(G).
108. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
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either counseling or litigation. The same adjectives appear, albeit in
inconsistent fashion, in many decisions interpreting the Alcoa "in-
tent-effect" test. 10 9 The Act does confirm, however, a congressional
intent that the Sherman Act not reach all conduct, anywhere in the
world, which has some traceable effect on United States domestic
commerce, exports or imports. Far less clear, however, is whether the
language of the Act will successfully provide operable criteria to
determine where to draw the line between Sherman Act coverage and
non-coverage.
Second, it is also not clear whether the specific effect test set forth in
the Act is limited to determining whether export transactions or
purely foreign transactions have the requisite effect on United States
trade. The test might also be used in determining whether import
transactions (for example, an international cartel as in Alcoa and
Uranium) have the requisite effect on United States trade.
Third, it would be unfortunate if courts interpreted the Act as
eliminating entirely the intent element of the Alcoa "intent-effect"
test. The House Report states that foreseeability rather than intent
was chosen to make the standard an objective one and to avoid-at
least at the jurisdictional stage-inquiries into the defendant's subjec-
tive motives. "0 "Reasonably" was also inserted to connote an objective
standard: "The test is whether the effects would have been evident to
a reasonable person making practical business judgments, not whether
actual knowledge or intent can be shown.""' While the courts since
Alcoa have properly emphasized effect, evidence of an intent to affect
United States trade should remain relevant if only to show the likeli-
hood and extent of the effect on trade.
Fourth, the Act will probably not avoid or reduce antitrust conflicts
with foreign nations. Most of those conflicts have resulted from United
States antitrust actions involving foreign conduct and international
cartels having an alleged effect on United States imports or domestic
commerce, such as Uranium and OPEC."2 These situations would
appear to be excluded from the Act. Indeed, conflicts will more likely
increase as a result of the legislation as a whole. The Export Trading
Company Act's creation of a second exemption for export cartels may
result in increased foreign antitrust enforcement against United States
export trading companies whose conduct adversely affects competi-
tion in foreign countries. " 3
Fifth, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act should not be
interpreted as a rejection of the Timberlane balancing or comity
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 26, 60 and accompanying text.
113. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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approach to jurisdiction. This is clear from the House Report on H.R.
5235, which adopts a neutral position toward the courts' reliance on
comity factors.1 1 4 The Act should be viewed, therefore, simply as a
refinement of the first step of the Timberlane-Mannington Mills anal-
ysis.
Sixth, the House Report adopts the National Bank of Canada v.
Interbank Card Association" 5 definition of the requisite effect on
United States domestic commerce." 6 National Bank limits effects to
those "of the type that the antitrust laws prohibit.""17 The House
Report states:
For example, a plaintiff would not be able to establish United
States antitrust jurisdiction merely by proving a beneficial effect
within the United States, such as increased profitability of some
other company or increased domestic employment, when the plain-
tiff's damage claim is based on an extra-terratorial effect on him of
a different kind." 8
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act also fails to moot
the establishment of a national commission. The Act, because of its
narrow emphasis on export transactions, resolves few of the legal and
factual issues outlined below as meriting commission study.
III. COMMISSION AGENDA
In light of the recent developments in international trade, and the
failure of the recent legislation to address adequately the issues raised
by these developments, a commission should examine the following
agenda items:
(A) United States national interests in international anti-
trust and trade policy;
(B) impact of the antitrust laws on United States business;
(C) means for avoidance and resolution of conflicts with
other nations;
114. The House Report states:
[T]he bill is intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial
recognition of the special international characteristics of transactions. If a
court determines that the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction are
met, this bill would have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of
comity ... or otherwise to take account of the international character of
the transaction. Similarly, the bill is not intended to restrict the application
of American laws to extraterritorial conduct where the requisite effects exist
or to extraterritorial pursuit of evidence in appropriate cases.
H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (citation omitted).
115. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
116. H.R. Rep. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982).
117. 666 F.2d at 8.
118. H.R. Rep. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982).
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(D) antitrust policy implications of foreign government
intervention in international trade; and
(E) relationships between antitrust laws and unfair trad-
ing laws.
A. National Interests
The first task of a commission is to identify the United States
national interests in enforcing its antitrust laws in international trade.
These interests should then be integrated as much as possible into a
coherent policy framework in which to place antitrust enforcement in
international trade. It must be recognized, however, that various
economic and political interests arguably underlie the application of
United States antitrust laws in international trade. Furthermore, a
general identification of these interests is far easier to accomplish than
precisely defining them, assessing their comparative importance or
analyzing the relationship among them in the formulation and opera-
tion of specific antitrust rules. The difficulties in implementing the
various policy interests in antitrust enforcement are compounded
when one attempts to integrate antitrust policy into a broader foreign
economic policy, which might include balance of payment and na-
tional security considerations, among many others. This makes un-
likely a complete integration of antitrust into general foreign policy. It
also makes antitrust enforcement authorities unlikely or inappropriate
candidates for the formulation of such a general policy. Despite this
pessimism, the important role enjoyed by antitrust dictates that the
hard fundamental questions about the relationship of antitrust to
other national interests and policies must continue to be asked even
though it is recognized that enduring answers cannot be given.
A commission, divorced from the constraints of particular disputes
and composed of members with different perspectives and expertise,
would be best placed to ask these broad questions and to attempt to
answer them. That attempt would certainly help to clarify the inter-
ests underlying antitrust policy in international trade. This section is
intended both to provide a tentative outline of the more important
national interests and to serve as an illustration of the type of general
interests that a commission might examine.
A variety of sometimes competing national interests have been
advanced to support enforcement of United States antitrust laws in
foreign commerce. Antitrust policy is but one of many elements that
should go into the formulation of foreign economic policy. Other
policies and national interests are involved, some of which, on a few
occasions, have been given greater weight than antitrust policies.
These can include national security, military and diplomatic consider-
ations; monetary, balance of payment and fiscal policies; and tariff,
import quotas and other protectionist policies.
Merger control policy in many foreign countries is an excellent
example of a blending of "competition" policies and other national
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policies such as balance of payment and export enhancement. 1 9 For
example, an increased emphasis on antitrust enforcement may in-
crease efficiency and lower consumer prices in an inflationary, low-
growth period on the national level. When the international economy
is stagnant, however, countries with balance of trade deficits may seek
to protect their domestic industries from foreign competition.
The initial question is to what extent is it in the United States
interest to apply its antitrust laws in international trade? The United
States as a highly developed country might conclude that American-
based firms can operate more efficiently than foreign rivals and thus
decide, other things being equal, to encourage competition in interna-
tional trade through enforcement of antitrust laws. As seen earlier,1 20
however, the declining competitive position of many American firms
and the increasing "internationalization" of the United States econ-
omy makes that conclusion less certain than it would have been thirty
years ago. A developing country, on the other hand, might prefer
protection of its domestic traders against more established and "effi-
cient" foreign competitors. Such a preference does not necessarily lead
to rejection of antitrust laws, however, as evidenced by the UNCTAD
Code on Restrictive Business Practices. 2 1 The UNCTAD Code, like
domestic antitrust laws, can be given a protectionist construction by
officials who are concerned more with protecting local interests than
with world free trade or free market principles. The effect of such
construction would be, however, to subordinate certain goals of anti-
trust enforcement (such as efficient allocation of resources) to nation-
alist interests (such as development of local manufacturing capacity
and employment).
1. Economic Interests
The protection of American consumers (primarily through antitrust
prohibitions on import restraints) and the protection of American
export and investment opportunities (primarily through antitrust pro-
hibitions on export restraints) are the two major economic interests
underlying United States antitrust enforcement in international trade.
These two goals were explicitly recognized by the Justice Department
in its 1977 International Antitrust Guide.12 2 The 1982 legislation re-
flects these two interests as well. 23 Thus, they should continue to
inform the application of the antitrust laws in international trade.
119. See generally B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 241-73.
120. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
121. UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doe. TD/RBP/CONF/10
(1980). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
122. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and International Operations,
reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 4-5 (Feb. 1, 1977).
123. See Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
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A third possible economic interest is the protection of competition
for its own sake in international trade. This interest emphasizes the
value of the competitive process itself to United States commerce
irrespective of the short-run effect on American consumers or ex-
porters. This third economic interest is broader than the first two and
arguably supports the application of United States antitrust laws to
restrictive arrangements that injure foreign competitors or customers
primarily in foreign markets even without substantial adverse effect
on American consumers or exporters. One example would be a tying
arrangement imposed by an American supplier on a Brazilian buyer
that forecloses only foreign competing suppliers from selling the tied
product to the Brazilian buyer.124 In this example, the first two eco-
nomic interests do not support application of United States antitrust
coverage. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act makes it
clear that the Sherman Act does not apply in this situation unless
United States suppliers are also foreclosed, and then only to the extent
of injury to United States export trade. 25 Thus, the Act reflects a
rejection of a United States interest in the protection of international
competition per se. This interest rests largely on the notion that com-
petition best promotes the most efficient allocation of world resources,
a notion not accepted by all nations. Moreover, a national interest in
competition at the domestic level does not necessarily imply a concom-
itant national interest in competition at the international level.
Because of the ambiguities and the difficulties attendant with this
general interest of protection of competition per se, the two economic
interests specifically articulated in terms of protection of American
consumers and exporters provide firmer guidance to the decision-
maker in applying United States antitrust laws in international trade.
A fourth asserted economic interest, "inward investment," might
require relaxation or at least modification of present antitrust rules in
international trade. Increasingly, the United States will have to rely
on access to foreign sources of capital, natural resources and perhaps
technology as well. The antitrust implications of this growing national
interest in inward investment and the historical shift from self-depen-
dence to reliance on foreign natural resources could be significant.
The need for foreign capital could require relaxation of antitrust
merger and joint venture rules in order to facilitate foreign entry or
participation in United States markets. Access to natural resources
may require more lenient treatment of foreign-based joint ventures,
mergers and other arrangements among competitors. Antitrust rules
124. See generally B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 188-97.
125. See Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
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on technology transfers through licensing of patents and knowhow
may require modification to permit United States firms to gain
quicker and more advantageous access to foreign technology. The
1982 legislation provides no response to this increasingly important
national interest.
2. Political and Moral Interests
Political interests also have played a role in international antitrust
enforcement. A major political interest is the minimization of conflicts
with trading partners. The Justice Department notifies and, to some
extent consults with, foreign governments whose interests are affected
by proposed or pending United States civil and criminal antitrust
actions. 12 For example, the Justice Department's practice is to notify
in advance foreign governments in whose territory the Department
intends to gather information pursuant to an antitrust investigation. 12 7
As seen below, the policy of minimization of conflicts frequently has
been deemphasized in favor of the United States national interest in
enforcing the antitrust laws to protect domestic consumers or ex-
porters. A recent example was the conviction of, and imposition of
over $6 million in fines on, European ocean shipping carriers in
connection with liner agreements in the North Atlantic trade.228 On
the other hand, there have been prosecutorial compromises between
the economic interests above and the political interest of minimization
of conflicts. The most recent public example concerned the uranium
cartel investigation, in which only the United States-based participant
was indicted, after which it tendered a nolo contendere plea and was
fined $40,000.129
126. The United States has had bilateral consultation and cooperation procedures
with Canada since 1959, including exchange of information provisions. See generally
Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States:
A View From Abroad, 11 Cornell Int'l L.J. 195 (1978). In 1976 the United States and
West Germany entered into a cooperation agreement. Agreement on Restrictive
Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-West Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 8291. "Good working relations" also exist with the British and Japanese
antitrust authorities. Flexner, Foreign Discovery and U.S. Antitrust Policy-the
Conflict Resolving Mechanisms, Fifth Annual Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 380, 384 (B.
Hawk ed. 1979). And in 1982 a significantly broader cooperation agreement was
made with Australia. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
127. M. Egan, Address before the International Bar Association 9-10 (Nov. 3,
1977) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 320-
21.
128. See supra note 38.
129. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., [U.S. Antitrust Cases Summaries, Com-
plaints, Indictments, Developments 1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 45,078, at 53,722-23 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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Other political interests may also exist. First, the United States has
an interest in encouraging regimes and economic regulation based on
rules of law rather than on the discretionary power of government
officials. It is not clear, however, to what extent enforcement of
United States antitrust laws in international trade furthers this policy
objective, other than by providing a rule of law example to other
nations. For example, American antitrust enforcement, with its em-
phasis on the judicial process, adversarial decision-making and puni-
tive fines and damages, may be considered too rigid, costly and time-
consuming to serve as an appropriate model for many foreign nations.
Second, the United States has a political interest in encouraging the
adoption of free trade and free market principles throughout the
world. As with some of the other political interests, the role of anti-
trust enforcement is not free from ambiguities. On the one hand,
antitrust enforcement can promote acceptance of free market princi-
ples by setting a successful example and by achieving the economic
benefits associated with free market principles. On the other hand,
antitrust enforcement that antagonizes foreign nations because of
their differing political or economic views of market regulation or
because of perceived infringements of sovereignty is a doubtful vehicle
for persuading those nations to adopt free market principles.
Third, the antitrust laws might be relaxed to help United States
firms compete in world markets. The exemptions for export cartels
found in the Webb-Pomerene Act 130 and the Export Trading Com-
pany Act13' are examples. The courts and enforcement authorities
have largely resisted, however, a mercantilist use of United States
antitrust laws by, for example, narrowly interpreting the Webb-Po-
merene exemption. 32 The Export Trading Company Act indicates,
however, greater congressional willingness to relax the antitrust laws
in order to promote exports.
Less persuasive than the economic and political interests above is an
asserted moral interest in United States antitrust enforcement in inter-
national trade. The United States is said to have a moral interest in
applying its antitrust laws to prohibit "immoral" business conduct,
even when that conduct occurs outside the United States; for example,
fraudulent bidding by United States-based firms in connection with a
foreign construction project.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976); see B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 3(B).
131. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 103, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 719 (Oct. 7, 1982).
132. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 3(B). The Supreme Court has stated: "[I]n
the Webb-Pomerene Act ... Congress has provided a narrow and carefully limited
exception for export activity that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws." Pfizer,
Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 n.12 (1978).
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The issue whether moral interests should underlie antitrust enforce-
ment is a controversial one, even in the domestic context. For exam-
ple, courts disagree as to whether the commission of a state-law
business tort (such as inducement of a breach of contract) also consti-
tutes a federal antitrust violation when it has little or no anticompeti-
tive effect on the market. The trend is toward rejection of an antitrust
claim in this situation,1 33 partially on the rationale that ethical or
fairness considerations should be accorded little or no weight in anti-
trust analysis. 3 4 At the least, such consideration should not result in
antitrust liability when the challenged conduct has only minimal
anticompetitive effects. It is submitted that this rationale applies a
fortiori in foreign markets where the "injured" foreign government
can apply its own moral values through its laws to conduct that it
finds reprehensible.
Once the United States interests in enforcing its antitrust laws in
international trade have been identified, important questions remain
about their implementation. One framework for this implementation
is to base the jurisdictional scope of the antitrust laws on three of the
interests outlined above: the two economic interests of protection of
American consumers and protection of American export and invest-
ment opportunities, and the political interest of minimization of con-
flicts. This formulation has the merit of some consistency with the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 35 and those recent deci-
sions136 that establish a two-part test for coverage: effect on United
States imports or exports and balancing of United States and foreign
interests.
B. Impact of Antitrust Laws on American Business
The impact of the antitrust laws on American business, particularly
in export trade, has been a controversial subject for many years. For
example, several years ago the National Association of Manufacturers
issued a report which concluded that the antitrust laws were signifi-
cantly hampering the competitive ability of American firms to do
business abroad. 137 Justice Department officials, on the other hand,
133. See Franklin Music Co. v. ABC, 616 F.2d 528, 546 (3d Cir. 1979); Northwest
Paper Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
134. See Northwest Paper Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., 576 F.2d 83, 88-89 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
135. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1084, at 722 (Oct. 7, 1982).
136. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 52-53
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1977).
137. National Ass'n of Mfrs., The International Implications of U.S. Antitrust
Laws, reprinted in International Aspects of Antitrust Law: Hearings on the Present
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consistently have denied this charge.138 The controversy continues. 139
In congressional hearings in 1981 a number of trade experts testified
that the United States export performance has declined in recent years
and that the antitrust laws are a major cause of this decline. 40 Anti-
trust laws are almost certainly not as important, however, as other
export disincentives such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977,141 control regulations and taxation policies.142
The Export Trading Company and the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Acts of 1982 are legislative responses to the perceived
concern that the antitrust laws are hampering United States export
efforts. The creation of a second export cartel exemption and the
"clarification" of Sherman Act jurisdiction with respect to export
arrangements is intended to reduce any adverse antitrust impact on
exporting. Whether any reduction will result from the 1982 legislation
remains unclear for several reasons. First, the history of the Webb-
Pomerene exemption and the cumbersome certification procedure in
the 1982 Act belie optimism that firms will rush to form export
trading companies. Second, the "clarification" of the Sherman Act
may prove to have little effect on the impact issue primarily because it
fails to "clarify" the perceived antitrust uncertainty surrounding many
business arrangements, such as foreign-based joint ventures, technol-
ogy transfers and involvement with foreign-based, government-in-
spired cartels.
State, Current Theory and Trends of International Antitrust Laws Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1416 (1973-1974).
138. For example, William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, testified in 1981:
Concern that joint export activities would violate the antitrust laws, or at
least generate costly litigation, has been cited as a deterrent to such activi-
ties and as an inhibiting factor in export trade.... I would like to repeat
again the firm view of the Department of Justice that these concerns are
largely unfounded ....
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on S. 795 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981) (statement of William F.
Baxter).
139. Compare Ongman, Is Somebody Crying "Wolf"?: An Assessment of Whether
Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, 1 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 163 (1979) (little or no
adverse impact) with Schwechter & Schepard, The Effects of United States Antitrust
Laws on the International Operations of American Firms, 1 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus.
492 (1979) (significant adverse impact).
140. See generally Export Trading Company Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 144
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Policy of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. IV 1980).
142. See generally Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on S. 795
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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Unfortunately, therefore, the impact issue will probably continue
to provoke debate despite the 1982 legislation. Given that Congress
has recently examined the impact issue and has attempted to deal with
it, a national commission should probably assign the impact issue a
low priority on its agenda, at least until experience under the 1982
legislation is obtained. With that qualification in mind, this section
provides a summary of the impact issue together with suggestions of
the kinds of problems and questions meriting commission study.
The impact of antitrust enforcement on United States export per-
formance is unclear for several reasons. First, empirical data is scanty
at best and anecdotal in nature. Second, it is difficult to isolate
antitrust considerations from the frequently numerous set of variables
that go into a business decision. Moreover, antitrust constraints often
are offered to prospective business partners as reasons for decisions
that rest more on other commercial or financial considerations. Third,
the entire controversy is frequently clouded by the failure to distin-
guish between antitrust's impact on United States national interests
(such as export performance and balance of payments) and impact on
individual firms or industries. Despite these qualifications, an adverse
impact of the United States antitrust laws on American business can
be documented with respect to certain types of situations. The fre-
quency and significance of those situations, and the effect on United
States national interests, are harder to measure.
First, American firms may be hampered in their efforts to compete
in American markets by having to comply with stringent United States
antitrust laws to which foreign competitors are not subject, 43 either
because similarly strict foreign antitrust laws do not exist or because
United States jurisdiction is lacking over the foreign firms. This prob-
lem is aggravated, of course, by the "extraterritorial" scope given to
the United States antitrust laws. There are many examples of adverse
impact in this situation. American firms are frequently subject to
stricter antitrust rules when competing for foreign projects that re-
quire joint bidding, despite the rules suggested in the International
Antitrust Guide.144 The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982 should alleviate some of the concerns here, at least when the
joint bidders are United States residents and no other American firm is
otherwise involved in the project. Joint exploration and resource de-
velopment projects, and joint fund projects are other situations in
which American firms can suffer a competitive disadvantage because
143. See President's Message to Congress Reporting on United States Export Pro-
motion Policies, 1980-1981 [Vol. II] Pub. Papers 1689, 1689-92 (Sept. 9, 1980).
144. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and International Operations Case
C, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 19-22 (Feb. 1, 1977).
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of United States antitrust laws.1 45 Increase in foreign antitrust enforce-
ment might reduce, to some extent, any adverse impact on American
business resulting from United States antitrust enforcement. Firms
now face competition rules in Western Europe that are in some in-
stances stricter than American rules. For example, the Common Mar-
ket's rules on vertical territorial restrictions and on abuses of dominant
position or monopolization are stricter in many respects than current
United States antitrust rules. 146 Thus, the charge that United States
firms, unlike their foreign competitors, face the world's toughest anti-
trust laws has less weight today than thirty years ago. On the other
hand, inconsistent foreign antitrust rules can aggravate any adverse
impact of United States antitrust by placing American firms in a
position in which compliance with one set of laws results in breach of
another set of laws.' 47 For example, the Export Trading Company
Act's creation of a second exemption for export cartels will not change
the EEC's condemnation of export cartels that affect EEC trade.
The effect of foreign antitrust laws on the impact issue is not clear
for several reasons. Enforcement of such laws varies considerably and
the mere existence of antitrust legislation does not necessarily imply
serious enforcement. Moreover, foreign antitrust laws can have mixed
and even favorable effects on the operations of American firms. For
example, foreign laws reduce any adverse impact of United States
antitrust enforcement when the foreign rules are consistent with
145. The growth of foreign national petroleum marketing firms may have been
accelerated by the refusal or hesitation of American firms to pursue joint marketing
ventures with foreign national producing firms because of U.S. antitrust fears.
146. The EEC's Regulation 67/67 creates an almost per se rule against absolute
territorial restrictions, at least when the territories are coincident with member state
boundaries. Regulation No. 67/67/EEC of the Comm. of March 22, 1967, 10 J.O.
Comm. Eur. 849 (1967), reprinted in B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 834.
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty parallels § 2 of the Sherman Act and prohibits abuses
of a dominant position. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
March 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. While the monopoly power element of § 2
actual monopolization is usually measured in terms of market share in the neighbor-
hood of 60 to 70 percent, its counterpart "dominant position" under article 86 has
been based more directly on non-market share factors (such as patent position and
access to capital) with the result that a "dominant position" has been found with a
market share well under that usually required for monopoly power under § 2. See,
e.g., United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, 421, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429 (40-45 percent market
share sufficient to constitute a "dominant position"). See generally B. Hawk, supra
note 35, ch. 12; Hawk, EEC and U.S. Competition Policies-Contrasts and Conver-
gence, in Enterprise Law of the 80's, at 39 (1980).
147. The mere existence of inconsistent foreign rules, without more, would not
preclude U.S. antitrust liability. Some form of foreign government compulsion is
necessary. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, at 148-56.
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United States rules and both American and foreign competitors oper-
ate under the same legal constraints.148
The second situation in which an adverse impact can occur is when
American business is subject to conflicting foreign laws or policies. For
example, United States antitrust laws may prohibit, or at least place
in doubt, import restrictions in connection with foreign joint ventures
or American-owned foreign subsidiaries. In such cases, import restric-
tions may be requested by the host government when it views the
United States subsidiary as a vehicle for the foreign government's
development plans. The American firm in turn views the foreign
subsidiary as a vehicle for United States exports into that country. The
host government may tell the American firm that it will impose
import restraints on products for which a local manufacturing capa-
bility is being developed, but that it will cooperate on the import of
those products for which there is no local capability. Agreement to
such an arrangement creates some antitrust risk for the American firm
because it would involve cooperation with competitors in the host
country. The business problem is aggravated by the fact that compet-
ing foreign firms not subject to United States antitrust laws will
frequently enjoy a competitive advantage in this situation. For exam-
ple, stricter United States antitrust rules against ancillary restrictions
in joint ventures1 49 (such as territorial restrictions) may make a United
States firm a less attractive partner to a foreign firm or a foreign
government that either desires such restrictions or is neutral toward
them. The 1982 legislation fails to clarify the antitrust status of these
kinds of restrictions.
A third situation in which adverse impact can occur is when a
United States firm is subject to antitrust enforcement and prosecution
in more than one jurisdiction and runs the risk of a double penalty.
The probability of this risk increases with expansion of the territorial
scope of the enforcing jurisdictions. Thus, broad "extraterritorial"
application of United States and other nations' antitrust laws increases
the risk that double penalties will be imposed on American firms. In
addition, the same business conduct may bring a firm under the eye
not only of the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission,
but also the International Trade Commission' 50 and the Commerce
148. One example will suffice. Prior to British entry into the Common Market,
British firms often questioned the motives of American joint venture partners who
insisted on "open door" clauses permitting competitors access to jointly-held facili-
ties. The American firms' insistence rested on antitrust concerns. Following British
accession to the Common Market and to its stricter antitrust rules, the British firms
became less suspicious with the result that business operations and planning between
British and American firms were facilitated.
149. See Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 657 F.2d 971, 981 (8th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1768 (1982).
150. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Department.'-" This fragmentation of American antitrust enforce-
ment with the accompanying variation in goals and procedures adds
further uncertainty.
A fourth situation in which adverse impact could occur is when
foreign nations threaten reprisals against United States firms because
of foreign resentment against United States antitrust enforcement that
is perceived as infringing foreign sovereignty and interests. While
actual examples of such reprisals are hard to document, the threat is
probably not illusory.
Fifth, United States antitrust laws might have an adverse impact on
foreign investment in the United States. Strict American antitrust
laws, together with disclosure and other duties which could operate
outside the United States, may inhibit foreign firms from investing in
the United States through mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures or
licensing. This interferes with the United States interest in gaining
access to foreign capital, resources and technology. Moreover, foreign
reluctance to enter the United States market because of antitrust risks
could increase as that market shrinks relative to the rest of the world,
thus reducing potential rewards to the foreign investor or technology
holder. The 1982 legislation does not address this issue of inward
investment and commission scrutiny remains desirable.
Sixth, the perceived uncertainty of the antitrust laws as applied in
foreign commerce is frequently asserted as inhibiting American firms
in their conduct of business. This uncertainty is detrimental, not only
to American firms, but to United States national interests as well.
Again, trade experts and antitrust counsel disagree strongly both as to
the existence and extent of the uncertainty and its inhibitory im-
pact. 152 For example, Martin F. Conner testified in 1981 on behalf of
the Business Roundtable that:
[I]t is not difficult to pinpoint the general classes of international
business transactions that are restricted by the threat of antitrust
problems, but from which that threat should be eliminated. These
would include joint ventures or other arrangements among ex-
porters that may involve the allocation of territorial responsibilities
or the establishment of common prices or other terms of trade,
technology licenses that restrict sales by the contracting parties to
particular countries or regions, and offshore acquisitions that per-
mit U.S. firms to enter foreign markets. 15 3
The causes of the uncertainty are ambiguous and multifold. First,
the frequent complexity of the fact situations and the generality of the
151. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. III 1979).
152. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
153. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearings on S. 795 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1981).
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legal rules render "certain" antitrust counsel imprudent if not impos-
sible. For example, application of the muddled domestic antitrust
rules on joint ventures to foreign joint ventures calls more for creative
counseling than simple yes-no answers to business clients. Second,
some antitrust counsel may have tended to be overly "conservative" in
interpreting judicial decisions so as to cast doubt on certain business
arrangements in international trade, notably joint ventures and export
activities. Third, uncertainty unquestionably exists with respect to
significant unresolved legal issues that arise in the international con-
text. These include, among many others: 1) the application abroad of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's sanction of joint effort to influence
governmental action; 2) the definition and scope of the foreign gov-
ernment compulsion defense; 3) the definition and scope of the act of
state doctrine in antitrust cases; and 4) market definition in connec-
tion with mergers and joint ventures that cross national lines.
Finally, desirable patent and knowhow licensing by American
firms may have been inhibited by overly strict and uncertain United
States antitrust laws, although recent judicial decisions15 4 and recent
official Justice Department positions toward licensing'5 5 have both
relaxed the antitrust rules and made them more certain.
The Justice Department, through its Antitrust Division, has made
large strides towards reducing the uncertainty surrounding the appli-
cation of the antitrust laws in international trade. In 1977 the Depart-
ment issued an International Antitrust Guide.' 5 6 The Guide sets forth
enforcement policy not only in abstract terms but courageously also in
terms of specific responses to fairly detailed case hypotheticals. 1
5 7
Despite the significant benefits to the business world and to the anti-
154. See, e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122,
1128-30 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elecs. Corp., 648 F.2d 642,
646-48 (9th Cir. 1981).
155. In 1981 the Justice Department announced a far more tolerant position
toward licensing practices. The Department rejected the "nine no-no's," which was a
list of licensing practices the Department had viewed as per se unlawful in the early
1970's. For example, tie-ins, resale restraints, exclusivity and packaging are now
viewed under the more lenient rule of reason. In May 1982 one spokesman an-
nounced the Department's present position. If the intent and effect of licensing
restrictions are not to stifle competition but to efficiently exploit the technology being
transferred, the restrictions are likely to pass antitrust muster. Remarks by C. Stark,
Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section, A View of Current International Antitrust
Issues at the World Trade Institute Seminar (May 20, 1982).
For the most recent statement of official policy, see Baxter, Technology Transfers
Under U.S. Antitrust Law-An Official View, in Ninth Annual Fordham Corp. L.
Inst. (B. Hawk ed. 1983) (to be published).
156. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and International Operations,
reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt. II (Feb. 1, 1977).
157. Id.
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trust bar, the Guide cannot eliminate uncertainty entirely or lay to
rest all reasonable doubts about the operation of antitrust in the
international area. For one, the Guide does not bind courts and, in
fact, has rarely controlled the outcome of cases.
The Department has also argued that its Business Review Clearance
procedure'5 8 removes most uncertainty. Again, for a variety of rea-
sons, such as the fact that clearance is not binding in private litigation,
businesses and their counsel have not seen fit to use this procedure as it
is presently constituted. 5 9 Consequently, the Business Review Clear-
ance procedure has not significantly reduced uncertainty.
The 1982 legislation should help to remove some of the uncertainty.
Its narrow emphasis on export arrangements indicates, however, that
many of the uncertainties outlined above will remain. For example,
the legislation provides little or no guidance with respect to the fol-
lowing arrangements and issues, among others: foreign-based joint
ventures; territorial restrictions in patent and knowhow technology
licenses (such as restrictions on imports to the United States); foreign
acquisitions by United States firms; and the act of state doctrine,
foreign compulsion defense and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
American antitrust enforcement has also had in some instances a
favorable impact on United States business. For example, the consent
decree obtained in United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,160
in which the government charged that American and British book
publishers had divided world markets, resulted in the opening to
American publishers of foreign markets previously closed to them.
Extensive American enforcement against international cartels forty
years ago also probably facilitated the entry of American firms into
foreign markets.'""
A commission would provide a valuable service if it carefully exam-
ined the impact issue. Its main work would lie in the gathering of
empirical data, most efficiently obtained not through anecdotal testi-
mony but through delegated empirical studies.
C. Means for Avoiding and Resolving Conflicts
Enforcement of laws involving economic regulation of any sort
against conduct or parties outside the enforcing country frequently
causes conflicts with the perceived interests and policies of other
sovereign nations. As was stated in the hearings in connection with the
158. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1981).
159. See 2 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad
184-86 (2d ed. 1981).
160. 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
161. See Rahl, International Cartels and their Regulation, in Competition in
International Business: Law and Policy on Restrictive Practices 252-54 (1981).
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1961 amendments to the Shipping Act:16 2 "The foreign commerce of
our own Nation is likewise the foreign commerce of many other
nations, each having as much right to regulate it as is assumed by the
United States." 163 But while enforcement of United States securities
laws, 16 4 export control regulations6 5 and foreign boycott rules' 6 are
recent illustrations of international conflicts, antitrust has been the
chief focus of foreign complaints that application of American laws to
foreign conduct and persons is inappropriate, if not unlawful.
The flavor of much of the foreign outrage at American antitrust
enforcement is well-illustrated by the Canadian reaction to injunc-
tions issued in the Potash litigation.16 7 A former Deputy Premier of the
Saskatchewan provincial government stated that the provincial ad-
ministrator had set the price for potash, that Saskatchewan had every
right to do so and that the price had been set in the belief that the
industry was being mismanaged. He went on:
It is a piece of arrogant stupidity on the part of the Government of
the United States to try to interfere in what has happened and is
happening in Canada and the Province of Saskatchewan. 6
Foreign outrage has not been limited to strident comments to the
press. Formal diplomatic notes objecting to American antitrust en-
forcement have been sent to the State Department. Less diplomatic
steps have increased in number. Foreign blocking statutes (which
prohibit under varying circumstances production of documents and
other discovery and testimony for use in foreign proceedings like
American antitrust actions) have been enacted in many foreign coun-
tries. 69 Most of these statutes were passed in reaction to American
antitrust enforcement. Moreover, while the conflicts engendered by
these statutes are not new, they have become aggravated recently as a
162. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
163. Ocean Common Carriers-Dual Rate Contracts: Hearings on H.R. 6775
Before the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961).
164. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976); see, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909
(2d Cir. 1980); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII
Honeywell Bull, 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979).
165. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1982). The dispute over the export of technology for
use in the construction of the Western Siberia-European Natural Gas Pipeline pro-
vides the most current example.
166. 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1982); see [Oct.-Mar.] U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 279,
at A-1 (Oct. 23, 1979); [Apr.-Sept.] U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 271, at A-4 (Aug.
28, 1979).
167. United States v. AMAX, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,467 (N.D. Ill.
1977).
168. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1976, at 37, col. 2.
169. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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result of private and government attempts to obtain information con-
cerning alleged anticompetitive activities involving foreign govern-
ments; for example, the Uranium Litigation.170 Foreign government
response has significantly escalated the conflict, as exemplified in the
British Protection of Trading Interests Act,1 71 which goes further than
any of the other "blocking" statutes. 172 Several factors explain this
foreign reaction to United States antitrust enforcement.
First, differing economic philosophies or policies may exist. Despite
a trend toward the adoption of domestic and regional antitrust laws
among our trading partners (particularly in Western Europe), wide
divergences continue to exist between the United States' strong policy
favoring competition at the international level and the mercantilist
and protectionist policies of many of our allies. British attitudes
toward ocean shipping and Canadian attitudes toward natural re-
source development contrast sharply with American attitudes. For
example, the British fundamentally disagree with the traditional
United States position that the economics of ocean shipping requires a
modestly competitive market structure.17
3
Second, differing economic interests exist and can conflict. For
example, Australian and French economic and national security inter-
ests in regulating the production and marketing of essential natural
resources like uranium and uranium products can conflict (or at least
be difficult to reconcile in the short term) with the United States
interest in lower prices and expanded supply of uranium and uranium
products for American users. These differences in economic interests
can be more intractable than philosophical differences. The former
are both harder to reconcile and more immune from the conciliatory
effects of any world-wide convergence toward the acceptance of anti-
trust laws and policies.
Third, differing political interests and jurisprudential notions un-
derlie many of the conflicts that have resulted from American anti-
trust enforcement. Some foreign nations strongly object to so-called
"extraterritorial" application of United States antitrust laws on the
political ground of unwarranted interference with the sovereignty of
the foreign nation. 174 The objection to extraterritorial application is
170. In re Westinghouse Elecs. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1977); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elecs. Corp., [1978] 2
W.L.R. 81.
171. 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [Jan-June] Antitrust and Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 959, at F-1 (Apr. 10, 1980). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
173. See Hawk, Application of Competition Laws to Ocean Shipping, Eighth
Annual Fordham Corp. L. Inst. (J. Sweeney ed. 1982) (to be published).
174. This objection underlies the 1980 French statute. See Address by G. Guil-
laume, Director of Legal Affairs of the French Ministry of External Affairs, Chambre
de Commerce Internationale, Paris (Apr. 1981) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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also frequently voiced in legal terms as a violation of international
law.175 Many nations also object to the broad discovery rules available
in United States actions. 176 The American willingness to use legal rules
embodying economic regulation in order to achieve essentially politi-
cal ends is also objectionable to many trading partners. Examples
include the pipeline dispute concerning export control regulations and
the government-Bechtel antitrust action to prohibit compliance with
the Arab boycott. 177
It should also be noted that the increase in foreign antitrust enforce-
ment is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides a constit-
uency composed of foreign enforcement officials generally sympa-
thetic to a strong American antitrust policy. On the other hand, the
potential for conflict increases as broader geographical jurisdiction is
taken under foreign antitrust laws. One recent example is the EEC's
competition proceeding against American pulp paper suppliers who
are also members of a Webb-Pomerene association.17 8 The irony is
175. Most nations accept the following theories (or variations thereof) to support
prescriptive jurisdiction: 1) territoriality (acts within the enforcing country), Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 30 (1965); 2) the
nationality of the actor, id.; 3) the protective principle (criminal acts threatening the
security of the enforcing state or the operation of its governmental functions), id. §
33; and 4) the "universality" principle (based on the custody of the actor with respect
to criminal acts universally condemned as a matter of international public policy,
such as piracy and perhaps traffic in women). Id. § 34. The so-called "effects"
doctrine of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" as defined in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945), has been criticized as inconsistent
with these international standards. See, e.g., Haight, International Law and Extra-
territorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 639 (1954); Jennings,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 1957 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 146.
176. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elecs. Corp., [1978] 2
W.L.R. 81. The issue before the House of Lords was "whether any 'blue-pencil'
approach is appropriate in relation to [Westinghouse's] request or whether the whole
request is so far-reaching and so far of the nature of 'fishing' that, even though a
portion of it can be saved it ought to be rejected out of hand." Id. at 88; see also
Lever, Aspects of Jurisdictional Conflict in the Field of Discovery, Fifth Annual
Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 358 (B. Hawk ed. 1979).
177. United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 638 (1982); Response of Justice Department to Comments, 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,953, 12,955 (Mar. 28, 1978); Proposed Consent Decree and Competitive
Impact Statement, 42 Fed. Reg. 3716 (Jan. 19, 1977).
178. In 1981 the EC Commission sent a statement of objection to a number of
North American, Scandinavian and other non-Common Market firms charging them
with participating in a concerted practice to fix selling prices of pulp within the
Common Market. In response to the United States' request for consultations in order
to clarify those parts of the statement of objections dealing with the Webb-Pomerene
association defendants, the Director-General of the Commission's Directorate-Gen-
eral for Competition assured United States officials that:
The EC had no intention to proceed automatically against any Webb-
Pomerene association engaged in export trade in Europe, either on the basis
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that it is the United States government that has voiced concern that
the EEC's proceeding may interfere with American interests. Simi-
larly, the EEC's pending competition proceeding against IBM has
given rise to at least one United States diplomatic note.
Existing mechanisms to avoid or resolve international conflicts re-
sulting from American antitrust enforcement have obviously not been
successful. OECD notification and consultation have taken place, but
conflicts continue.179 OECD conciliation mechanisms have never been
invoked. It is doubtful whether the UNCTAD consultation procedures
will be any more effective. Bilateral cooperation agreements between
of their status as Webb associations or because of information exchange
activities of the type that do not facilitate price fixing.
The EC case against world wood pulp exporters is for price-fixing among a
multinational group of producers; it is specifically aimed at an alleged
pattern of price announcements and other price communications for wood
pulp involving North American and European producers. The involvement
of the [Webb-Pomerene association] is significant in the Commission's view,
because it provides a mechanism for price collusion which might otherwise
be impossible in a market with so large a number of sellers.
[T]he EC will carefully scrutinize the use of joint selling agents where it
does not contribute to competition by facilitating access to the market by
smaller firms which do not have the ability to market independently;
The Commission considers that export associations whose activities have
substantial anticompetitive effects in the Common Market may violate
Community competition law, even if the activities are authorized in the
association's home country.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S.-EC Consultations on the EC's Proceeding Against Wood
Pulp Producers (Jan. 14, 1982); see [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1050, at 267-68 (Feb. 4, 1982).
179. In 1973 the OECD adopted a resolution calling for consultation and concilia-
tion procedures among members. OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concern-
ing Consultation and Conciliation Procedure on Restrictive Business Affecting Inter-
national Trade, OECD Doe. C(73)99 (1973). In 1979 the OECD adopted a more
specific recommendation establishing a framework for consultation and cooperation
among antitrust enforcement authorities. OECD, Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(79)154 (1979).
Paragraph (4) of the Competition section of the 1976 OECD Guidelines for
Multinationals exhorts multinationals to
be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision of information,
with competent authorities of countries whose interests are directly affected
in regard to competition issues or investigations. Provision of information
should be in accordance with safeguards normally applicable in this field.
OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
OECD Doc. 21 (76)04/1 (1976), reprinted in Inst. for Int'l and Foreign Trade L. The
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: A Business Appraisal 257 (1977).
Paragraph (4) has several flaws that greatly weaken its usefulness. See B. Hawk,
supra note 35, at 809-11.
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the United States and Canada and between the United States and
West Germany have been more successful at coordinating antitrust
enforcement than at resolving conflicts. s0 The Australian agreement
was initialed only in June 1982 and it is premature to predict its
success.
International law principles have also been largely unsuccessful in
resolving antitrust conflicts. Decisions like Timberlane, which have
increasingly relied on comity considerations in determining whether
jurisdiction exists or should be exercised, offer some hope that the
courts themselves will alleviate some of the problems.',' That the
large majority of courts employing a Timberlane approach neverthe-
less have exercised jurisdiction,' 8 2 however, restrains exuberant opti-
mism.
The 1982 legislation also provides little basis for optimism that
conflicts will lessen in the future. The legislation creates a second
exemption for export cartels and is likely, therefore, to heighten the
risk of conflicts with trading partners who have active antitrust re-
gimes of their own, like the EEC. Also, the "clarification" of the
Sherman Act is limited to United States export trade, while most
foreign conflicts have arisen in connection with United States antitrust
actions involving foreign conduct having effects on United States
imports. For example, the 1982 legislation would not have avoided or
resolved the conflicts raised by the Uranium, OPEC and shipping
cases.
The seriousness of the conflicts and the failure of existing mecha-
nisms to resolve them call for serious consideration of new strategies.
A commission, sensitive to foreign concerns as well as to United States
interests, would be well suited to such a task.
As to government actions, comity and/or foreign policy issues could
be considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.' 83 Consulta-
tion with other agencies in the Executive Branch, particularly the
State Department, might be required. It is unclear, however, whether
or to what extent foreign policy issues are appropriate considerations
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, at least below cabinet level.
A more radical mechanism would be bilateral (or multilateral)
agreements with foreign governments establishing inter-governmental
procedures in connection with government antitrust actions that im-
plicate the other government's interests and policies. The recent agree-
180. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 16.
181. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 23.
183. The Justice Department generally takes into account comity considerations in
exercising prosecutorial discretion. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and
International Operations (1977), reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt.
II, at 6-7 (Feb. 1, 1977).
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ment with Australia is the most far-reaching example to date. This
agreement differs from the earlier cooperation agreements with Can-
ada and West Germany in that the Australia agreement requires
mutual notification and consultation with respect to antitrust investi-
gations and proceedings that may have implications for the other
party's laws, policies and national interests. During the consultations
both parties agree to avoid a possible conflict between their respective
laws, policies and national interests and for that purpose each agrees
to give due regard to the other's sovereignty and to considerations of
comity. 184 The Australia-United States agreement is not only a signifi-
184. More particularly, Australia agrees to give the fullest consideration to modi-
fying any aspect of its policy that has or might have implications for the United States
in relation to the enforcement of American antitrust laws and to give the fullest
consideration to any harm that may be caused by the implementation or continua-
tion of its policy to the interest protected by the United States antitrust laws. On the
other side, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission agree to give
the fullest consideration to modifying or discontinuing existing or contemplated
antitrust investigations or proceedings. In that regard, both agencies agree to con-
sider Australian interests with respect to those proceedings, including without limita-
tion, Australia's interest in circumstances in which challenged conduct:
(1) was undertaken for the purpose of obtaining a permission or approval
required under Australian law for the exportation from Australia of Austra-
lian natural resources or goods manufactured or produced in Australia;
(2) was undertaken by an Australian authority, being an authority estab-
lished by law in Australia, in the discharge of its functions in relation to the
exportation from Australia of Australian natural resources or goods manu-
factured or produced in Australia;
(3) related exclusively to the exportation from Australia to countries other
than the United States, and otherwise than for the purpose of re-exportation
to the United States, of Australian natural resources or goods manufactured
or produced in Australia; or
(4) consisted of representations to, or discussions with, the Government of
Australia or an Australian authority in relation to the formulation or imple-
mentation of a policy of the Government of Australia with respect to the
exportation from Australia of Australian natural resources or goods manu-
factured or produced in Australia.
Agreement Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United
States-Australia, art. 2, reprinted in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1071, at 36-37 (July 1, 1982). The parties also agree that documents and
information provided in the course of notification or consultation shall be treated
confidentially by the receiving party unless the providing party consents to disclosure
or disclosure is compelled by law. The United States also agrees not to use any
information or documents as evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding
under the United States antitrust laws. The United States would not be foreclosed
from pursuing an investigation of any conduct that is the subject of notification or
consultation or from initiating a proceeding based on evidence obtained from sources
other than the Australian Government. When consultations do not resolve a conflict,
each party is free to protect its interests as it deems necessary. In another significant
departure from the bilateral agreement with Canada and West Germany, the Aus-
tralian agreement provides that if the Australian Government so requests, the Justice
Department will participate in private actions challenging conduct encouraged by
the Australian Government. In the event of such a request, the Justice Department
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cant step toward cooperation between enforcement officials but also a
potential vehicle to resolve international conflicts.18 5
A bilateral (or multilateral) agreement might go further than the
Australian-United States agreement. For example, it might provide
for the following:
1) notification and consultation;
2) enumerated criteria governing the appropriateness of
unilateral antitrust enforcement; these criteria might incor-
porate some or all of the comity factors listed in Timberlane
and Mannington Mills;"8 and
3) binding arbitration if the governments cannot agree as
to the appropriateness of the antitrust action; for example, a
panel of three arbitrators might be chosen, one by each party
and the third by the two previously chosen arbitrators; this
panel would apply the enumerated criteria and render a
written opinion explaining their decision.8 7
This proposal has the additional advantage of providing sources of
law that could be useful to courts in private actions when determining
whether antitrust jurisdiction is appropriate. Careful attention would
have to be given to the identification and formulation of the criteria
governing that determination. For example, foreign policy factors (as
opposed to traditional conflict of laws factors) are more appropriate
here than in the exercise of unilateral prosecutorial discretion. The
precision and operability of the criteria are also crucial.',,
Private treble damage actions have created the most serious con-
flicts with foreign nations. Thus, conflict-resolving mechanisms that
affect only government actions are insufficient. A variety of mecha-
nisms in the private action area should be examined by a commission.
First, Justice Department monitoring and amicus intervention' 9 in
will disclose to the court the substance of consultations between the two govern-
ments. See generally id.
185. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
187. The idea of binding arbitration through bilateral agreements has been dis-
cussed in several fora. A similar idea was discussed at a Ditchley Conference in 1979.
More recently, Monroe Leigh urged at a meeting of the International Law Associa-
tion in 1981 that Congress empower the Executive to negotiate bilateral agreements
along the lines suggested here. M. Leigh, Address at the Annual Meeting Luncheon
of the American Branch of the International Law Association (Nov. 14, 1981),
reprinted in Am. Branch of the Int'l L. Ass'n, Proceedings and Committee Reports of
the American Branch of the International Law Association 44, 50 (1981-1982).
188. In a future article, the author will argue that a bilateral (or multilateral)
agreement with binding arbitration provides the most desirable solution to the anti-
trust conflicts problem. That article will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
such a solution, as well as the specifics of a model agreement.
189. Amicus intervention is provided for in the U.S.-Australia agreement. Agree-
ment Relating to Cooperation of Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, art. 6, United
States-Australia, reprinted in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1071, at 37 (July 1, 1982).
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
private litigation have been suggested. The scope and aim of an
amicus intervention could vary considerably, including: 1) simply
alerting the court to foreign policy and/or comity considerations; 2)
recommending whether jurisdiction is appropriate, relying upon a
comity or similar analysis that would be expressed to the court; or 3)
requesting that the court stay the proceedings for a period of time to
allow consultation between the United States and the foreign govern-
ment, after which the results of the consultation would be transmitted
to the court. This last alternative raises the tantalizing possibility that
arbitration decisions under bilateral agreements involving the appro-
priateness of jurisdiction in government actions, as suggested above,
might be made binding on courts in private actions. Constitutional
obstacles would have to be overcome, however, notably the article
II1190 requirement for a justiciable case or controversy. 191
Second, the treble damage provisions could be eliminated or modi-
fied in private actions in which conflicts with foreign governments
arise. For example, there might be a presumption in favor of single
damages (possibly with attorneys' fees to the winner). The court
would balance a variety of factors, such as nationality of the parties,
location of the conduct at issue and whether the conduct was lawful
where it occurred, to determine whether the presumption is rebutted.
A slightly different alternative would leave the decision to treble with
the court, except in the most egregious cases in which automatic
trebling would apply. These modifications might have two desirable
effects: 1) reduction of friction with foreign governments through
elimination of the punitive portion of the award; and 2) reduction of
friction because fewer private actions would be brought. The princi-
pal weakness with the single damage proposal and its variants lies
with the political and administrative difficulties of treating foreigners
differently under the antitrust laws. Another problem concerns the
definition of those "conflict" cases in which only single damages can
be awarded.
This outline of diverse possible strategies to the conflicts problem
illustrates well the need for a comprehensive and in-depth study by a
commission whose breadth of expertise and political prestige would
command congressional and executive attention to any recommenda-
tions for legislative action.
190. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
191. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443-44 (1944) (fragmentation of
action held constitutional; however, each court may be required to be an art. III
court).
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D. Antitrust Policy Implications of Foreign Government
Participation in International Trade
As seen above, one highly significant changed circumstance since
1945 has been increased foreign government participation in interna-
tional trade with a concomitant increase in dealings between private
firms and foreign governments. 192 Two significant antitrust policy
implications merit study. First, domestic antitrust substantive rules
may have to be modified in international trade. Second, the rules
governing the antitrust liability of private firms in connection with
their dealings with foreign governments are sorely in need of clarifica-
tion if they are not to unduly constrain United States business. The
1982 legislation does not address these issues or implications.
As to the first implication, two timely situations come immediately
to mind: "subsidization" of foreign competition and foreign "preda-
tion" of firms in United States markets. Both have been the subject of
antitrust litigation and both can be expected to appear more fre-
quently as United States antitrust claims.
The issue of foreign government "subsidization" as an antitrust
claim has arisen in the Polish Golf Cart9 3 litigation in which a United
States manufacturer of golf carts alleged that a state-owned Polish
manufacturer of competing carts (Pezetel) violated the Sherman Act,
the Wilson Tariff Act and the antidumping provision of the 1916
Revenue Act.19 4 Pezetel allegedly offered subsidized prices in the
United States lower than those offered by the plaintiff, and used
territorial restraints in the distribution of its carts. 9 The court, recog-
nizing that claims of unlawful foreign "subsidization" raise extremely
complex legal and economic issues, held that the plaintiff failed to
state an antitrust claim:
Plaintiffs do not allege that the prices charged by Pezetel, al-
though described as predatory and unfair, are less than Pezetel's
manufacturing cost, however determined, but merely that they are
'less than the cost of production of most domestic golf carts.'...
Rather plaintiff simply avers that most American manufacturers
are unable to produce a product competitive in price to that offered
by its foreign competition. That Pezetel's competitive advantage
results from a government subsidy by a controlled economy that
permits defendant to offer virtually identical products at a cheaper
price is not actionable under Sherman Act § 2 .... Certainly a
firm that exploits the opportunity through technology, cheap labor
192. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
193. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
194. Id. at 388.
195. Id. at 390-91.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
or a government subsidy to offer the same product at a reduced
price can be said to be responding normally to market opportuni-
ties. As such, defendant's use of low prices appears to fall within
the Grinnell exception and therefore is not considered mischievous
conduct from which § 2 intent can be inferred. 9"
Whether or not the court was correct in its ultimate conclusion, it was
certainly correct in its assessment of the complexities of the issue. If
the antitrust laws do or should apply, these complexities may well
require different substantive rules from those applied in purely domes-
tic cases.1 9 7
International predation, through predatory pricing or otherwise, is
presently at issue in several antitrust cases.' Again, the question
arises whether domestic predation rules (such as the Areeda-Turner
cost-based rules)199 should be modified when international or foreign
predation is alleged.
The issue of international predation may arise more frequently in
the next few years, in light of the increasing competition faced by
many United States industries. With respect to unilateral predation,
the first question is whether predatory pricing is more or less likely in
international markets than in domestic markets. There is substantial
disagreement among commentators as to the extent, if any, of preda-
tory pricing in United States domestic markets. 20 The issue at the
international level is even more complicated. On the one hand, sev-
196. Id. at 400, 404-05. In 1982 the district court in Pezetel granted plaintiff's
motion to amend the complaint to add a claim of predatory pricing based on an
allegation that defendants' golf carts were sold at prices below cost. Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 535 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Del. 1982). The court noted that
plaintiff had argued in 1978 that it was impossible to determine any Polish cost and,
therefore, the plaintiff had urged the court to adopt an alternate predatory pricing
model for use in cases in which defendant was an agency or instrumentality of a
state-controlled economy. 535 F. Supp. at 251. The court went on to state that the
1978 opinion did not question plaintiff's assertion that Polish costs are not determin-
able; the 1978 opinion simply held that any such alternative model must be adopted
by Congress rather than the court. 535 F. Supp. at 252.
197. For a decision involving the effect of domestic government subsidization on
antitrust claims, see Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
198. E.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 535 F. Supp. 248 (D. Del. 1982);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1148 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-2331 (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 1981).
199. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 oJ
the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975).
200. Compare McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 292 &
n.15 (1980) ("attempts at predation have been rare, and... successful attempts will
be found to be still rarer") with Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A
Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 890 (1976) (a comprehensive test is necessary to
determine that pricing is predatory).
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eral factors suggest that predatory pricing and other predation may be
more likely in international markets. For example, foreign producers
may be in a more advantageous position than domestic producers
because of foreign government subsidies and trade policies. Or a
foreign producer may have access to greater resources through its
participation in a number of separate foreign national markets, which
arguably permits it more safely to "cross-subsidize" predatory pricing
campaigns in the United States.2 01 The argument here is that the
foreign producer is better positioned than a domestic United States
predator who does business in different domestic markets (e.g., East
Coast and Middle West) because the foreign markets in which the
foreign predator is doing business can more easily be fragmented, thus
permitting more successful cross-subsidization.
This possibility of fragmentation of national markets touches upon
another fundamental issue or problem-access to national markets of
foreign producers. Many countries restrict access not only through
direct barriers like tariffs and quotas but also through non-tariff
barriers like national purchasing policies. All these barriers can be
used to insulate national producers from foreign competition and in
effect "subsidize" the export trade of these producers through higher
domestic prices. Thus, the issue of international predation is bound
closely to the problem of governmental trade barriers that restrict
access to national markets.
There are, however, a number of considerations indicating that
international predation is less likely to occur than domestic predation.
First, it can be argued that one might intuitively expect a foreign
predator to have a more difficult job of destroying domestic producers
than a domestic predator because of domestic political and protection-
ist policies. Second, the foreign predator may face higher barriers to
entry and concomitantly, the domestic victims may have lower reen-
try barriers vis-a-vis the foreign predator as compared with a domestic
predator. Third, many of the dynamic or strategic considerations may
work to the relative disadvantage of a foreign predator. For example,
the argument that predation is unlikely given the possibility that
buyers will be willing to aid the intended victims (their suppliers)
through long-term contracts202 may apply a fortiori to a foreign preda-
tor who may be endangering the existence of local suppliers, particu-
larly where local (or national) suppliers are especially desired. Fourth,
some of the factors asserted in favor of a greater likelihood of interna-
tional predation are possibly flawed. For example, the assertedly
201. See Ordover, Sykes & Willig, Unfair International Trade Practices, 15
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. (to be published 1983).
202. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counter Strategies, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 263, 270-71 (1981).
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greater access of foreign predators to resources arguably rests upon
relative capital market imperfections in the United States and abroad.
Whether such capital imperfections exist is open to question.
The second question in connection with unilateral predation is
whether domestic predation rules are appropriate. For example, most
courts have adopted cost-based rules to evaluate domestic pricing;
that is, only prices below some cost (marginal cost, average variable
cost, etc.) are deemed predatory.20 3 A number of differences between
alleged domestic and international predation suggest caution before
domestic rules are blindly applied to alleged international predation.
For example, most of the proposed cost-based rules on domestic pre-
dation rest on efficiency grounds (short-term or long-term). Given the
widely differing governmental policies and trading conditions in vari-
ous countries, it is unclear whether one can make the same efficiency
judgments in international markets. Moreover, the greater difficulties
in determining costs of a foreign producer may significantly weaken
or alter cost-based rules developed in a purely domestic context. Stra-
tegic considerations or rules, on the other hand, may be more appro-
priate in the international context. 20 4
As to predatory cartels at the international level, the question again
arises whether they are more likely to occur than purely domestic
cartels. International cartels may be more likely because foreign firms
may find it easier to collude after a successful predatory campaign
because of less stringent foreign antitrust laws in their home market or
because of foreign government cooperation.20 5 Even those foreign
countries or regional groups with relatively strict antitrust laws (such
as the EEC and West Germany) may give little enforcement attention
to predation outside their territories for jurisdictional or case selection
reasons. This enforcement lacuna is widened by the neutral, and in
many instances the positive, position taken toward export cartels that
can engage in foreign predation. Finally, predatory cartels composed
of foreign producers may be more frequent in developing countries
where local cartel bans may be inadequate and home country bans are
inapplicable. One recently alleged example concerns predation of the
Brazilian electrical equipment market by Japanese and European
producers.2 °6
203. For a survey of the decisions, see Hurwitz, Kovacic, Sheehan & Lande,
Current Legal Standards of Predation, in Federal Trade Commission, Strategy,
Predation and Antitrust Analysis 101 (S. Salop ed. 1981).
204. For examples of strategic rules, as compared with cost-based rules, see
Scherer, supra note 200; Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare
Analysis, 87 Yale L.J. 284 (1977).
205. See Ordover, Sykes & Willig, supra note 201.
206. See K. Mirow & H. Maurer, Webs of Power: International Cartels and the
World Economy 36 (1982).
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The second implication for antitrust policy arising from foreign
government involvement in international trade concerns the substan-
tive rules governing the antitrust liability of private firms, particularly
United States-based firms. A number of defenses or doctrines are
available to preclude liability of private firms, notably: act of state
doctrine, foreign sovereign compulsion, sovereign immunity and the
application abroad of Noerr-Pennington .207 But a host of unresolved
issues exist with respect to each defense or doctrine, creating undue
uncertainty on the part of firms that must interact with foreign gov-
ernments and foreign government instrumentalities if they are to
remain competitive. A few of the many significant unresolved issues
are:
1) whether the act of state doctrine precludes inquiry into
the motivation of foreign government actions as well as their
validity; 208
2) whether the compulsion defense covers conduct outside
the territory of the compelling foreign state; 209 and
3) whether Noerr-Pennington applies to foreign govern-
ments in the first place. 21 0
These doctrines and defenses have evolved over many years and to a
certain extent largely outside the antitrust area. Their present-day
application in an antitrust context should be reexamined. Moreover,
each doctrine has evolved separately and courts have continued to
apply each independently in a particular case. This can result in a
situation in which separate analysis under each defense or doctrine
leads perhaps inappropriately to imposition of liability on private
firms in connection with foreign government-involved conduct. That
is, jurisdiction may be found and each defense rejected for failure to
meet the conditions or elements of each defense.
The Uranium litigation provides an interesting hypothetical. If a
court were to employ by analogy the jurisdictional test specified in the
1982 legislation ("direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
207. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
208. The circuits are divided. Compare Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co., 594 F.2d 48, 53 (5th Cir. 1979) (inquiry into foreign government's motivation
held improper), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980) with Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550
F.2d 68, 73-75 (2d Cir.) (foreign government's motivation considered), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977). See generally B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch.3(C).
209. One decision can be read to reject such a limitation. See Interamerican
Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 & n.13 (D. Del.
1970). The Justice Department embraces such a territorial limitation. See U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Guide on Antitrust and International Operations Case L, reprinted in
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) No. 266, pt. II, at 53 (Feb. 1, 1977). See generally B. Hawk,
supra note 35, ch. 3(C).
210. See B. Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 3(C).
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fect" on United States domestic commerce, import trade or export
trade211), it might very well find that the foreign-based cartel would
have the requisite effect. If a Timberlane comity approach were then
used, there would be a high likelihood that jurisdiction would also be
found, for it is doubtful that United States courts would balance in
favor of the foreign national interest. This would be particularly true
if United States consumers had been hurt, and if it would be against
the United States interest in enforcing the Sherman Act, which has
been described by the Supreme Court as the "comprehensive charter
of economic liberty. '2 12 Having found jurisdiction, a court would
then proceed to examine separately each "defense." Probably, no act
of state would be present because the foreign governments (for exam-
ple, France) would not have taken sufficient legislative or administra-
tive action to constitute an "act of state." The French authorities may
simply have encouraged the formation of a cartel composed of private
firms. Thus, even though the cartel would be in France's interest, and
even though there would be very serious French government involve-
ment, a court probably would decline to find an act of state.
As to the foreign government compulsion defense, there is a high
probability that this defense would fail because there would be no
compulsion. The French government may not have "compelled" the
firms to participate in the cartel.
There is no sovereign immunity defense because that defense is
available only to the foreign governments. There is no Noerr-Pen-
nington defense because no one is challenging the firms' inducement
of the French government to form the cartel.
Given the intimate foreign government involvement and the strong
foreign interests, it is not entirely clear that United States antitrust
liability should be imposed on private firms in cases like the hypotheti-
cal posed. Nonetheless, this may well be a situation in which a
pinched analysis under each legal defense or doctrine, with attention
paid exclusively to the technical conditions of each, results in liabil-
ity.213
The growing involvement of United States firms with foreign gov-
ernments and state enterprises heightens the incidence and signifi-
cance of antitrust risks with concomitant restraints on United States
business. Thus, a general reassessment.of the foreign compulsion de-
fense, the act of state doctrine and the application of Noerr-Pen-
211. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1084, at
722 (Oct. 7, 1982). The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act purports to
clarify the effects test only with respect to export transactions, while the Uranium
hypothetical largely concerns import transactions. Courts might be expected, how-
ever, to apply the 1982 clarification to import transactions as well as export transac-
tions.
212. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
213. See Comment, Defenses to International Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate Ap-
proach, 5 Fordham Int'l L.J. 441, 461-67 (1982).
[Vol. 51
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST POLICY
nington doctrine abroad would be useful in order to determine
whether the interpretation of those doctrines and defenses are further-
ing United States interests or unduly inhibiting United States firms in
doing business abroad. A reassessment would also be useful to deter-
mine whether the independent operation of each doctrine and defense
makes sense when the doctrines and defenses are viewed together
under the general issue of private firm liability in connection with
non-"compulsive" foreign government action. Such a reassessment
might be better accomplished by a commission unencumbered by the
judicial tendency to examine each doctrine or defense separately.
E. Relationship Between Antitrust Laws and Unfair Trading Laws
A veritable plethora of legislation, agencies and courts have over-
lapping and sometimes conflicting jurisdiction over international
trade issues. There are, of course, the "traditional" domestic antitrust
or unfair competition laws: Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. There are also a number of other laws concerning
unfair trade practices in international trade: the Wilson Tariff Act,
214
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended,2 15 the antidumping
provisions in new Subtitle IV of the Tariff Act of 1930,216 section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended,2 1 7 and section 303 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 as amended.218 Allegations of "unfair" trade practices can
also arise in "escape clause" 219 and "market disruption" proceed-
ings.220
214. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
215. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
216. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (Supp. IV 1980).
217. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (Supp. IV 1980).
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
219. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides an "escape clause" procedure
for obtaining temporary import relief and adjustment assistance to industries, firms
and employees injured as a result of increased imports into the United States. 19
U.S.C. § 2251 (1976 & Supp. 1980). The International Trade Commission [ITC]
makes the injury determination and recommends the type(s) of relief to the President.
The President has the discretion in most situations of denying relief or of specifying
relief different from the ITC's recommendations, subject to congressional override.
See generally Adams & Dirlam, Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A
Case Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation by the International Trade Commis-
sion, 52 Ind. L.J. 535 (1977); Ris, "Escape Clause" Relief Under the Trade Act of
1974: New Standards, Same Results, 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 297 (1977); Note,
Interpretive History of the Escape Clause under the Trade Act of 1974, 12 J. Int'l L.
& Econ. 531 (1978). Although Section 201 proceedings do not require a showing of
"unfair" trade practices, the issue has been raised. See generally, Applebaum, Escape
Clause and Market Disruption Proceedings-A Private View, Fifth Annual Fordham
Corp. L. Inst. 249 (B. Hawk ed. 1979).
220. Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides for import relief from "market
disruption" caused by imports from Communist bloc countries. 19 U.S.C. § 2436
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see Applebaum, supra note 219, at 258.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The relationship between the traditional antitrust laws (like the
Sherman Act) and the unfair trading laws has been subject to much
dispute. Again, a coherent United States trade policy requires a com-
prehensive examination of that relationship and the overlapping and
conflicting enforcement bodies involved.221
One can easily hypothesize a situation in which the same conduct
can be challenged under many if not most of the statutes mentioned
above, thus placing the parties in a variety of fora and involving
several agencies and departments. For example, a contention that
foreign suppliers are hurting American firms through "predatory"
prices in the United States could be translated into claims or proceed-
ings under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,22 2 section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act,22 3 sections 303 and 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930,224 the antidumping provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916225 and
new Subtitle IV of the Tariff Act of 1930,226 and perhaps even section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974.227 This could entail participation of the
Justice Department, Commerce Department, Special Trade Repre-
sentative, Federal Trade Commission, International Trade Commis-
sion and private party actions in federal courts. As mentioned above,
claims of "international predation" and "foreign subsidization" can be
expected to increase. The hypothesis, therefore, is a realistic one.
This panoply of differing statutory standards and institutional ma-
chinery can deservedly be labeled Byzantine. That Byzantium en-
dured for a millenium with such complexities offers no basis for
concluding that the United States and its trade policy shall so long
endure. While a comprehensive commission study of this American
Byzantium may not ensure the continued existence of the Republic, it
would provide a sorely needed review of the relationship between
antitrust policy and unfair trade policy.
CONCLUSION
An in-depth and comprehensive reassessment of the application of
United States antitrust laws is timely and necessary. Such a reassess-
ment should be undertaken independent of any particular dispute.
The plethora and diversity of unresolved policy and more specific
221. To cite but one of many examples, the "traditional" antitrust enforcement
agencies (Justice Department and the FTC) have on a number of occasions inter-
vened before the ITC to argue that the ITC lacked "antitrust" jurisdiction. See B.
Hawk, supra note 35, ch. 6.
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
223. Id. §§ 13a-13b, 21a.
224. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976).
226. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (Supp. IV 1980).
227. Id. §§ 2411-2416.
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legal issues discussed throughout this Article confirm the need for a
commission and provide a working agenda for its study.
The need for a commission has not been mooted by recent legisla-
tion. As seen above, the Export Trading Company Act is quite narrow
and deals only with the tip of the international iceberg. The Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, which amends the foreign com-
merce jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, also fails to address most of the
important issues that merit commission study. Moreover, the jurisdic-
tional or "territorial" scope of the antitrust laws is intimately related
to issues that may not have been adequately addressed in the legisla-
tive decision to clarify the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act.
Thus, an extensive examination by a commission would provide a
more comprehensive analysis of the policy reasons for any clarification
of the jurisdictional scope of the antitrust laws. It would also provide
a comprehensive analysis of an amendment's effects on other issues not
considered in the narrower context of simply defining jurisdiction in
order to meet a legislative concern about the inhibitory impact of the
antitrust laws on United States exports. International antitrust may
not be a seamless web whose existence is shattered with the removal of
a single thread. But its threads are connected to a significant degree
and the resultant web is appropriately viewed by the United States
spider as promoting important national policies, while American
firms and foreign governments occasionally voice justifiable concerns
at their entrapment within the antitrust web.
A final reason supporting a commission is its ability to gather
empirical data. Such data is sorely needed before many of the issues
outlined above can be resolved with any degree of confidence. For
example, the commission, as contemplated in section 5(d) of S. 432,
would authorize the collection of empirical data. Indeed, much of the
commission's work may well lie in the initial formulation of problems
and issues, followed by study and discussion of data in the form of
reports rather than in the form of oral testimony.
Finally, the mandate of the commission should be limited to anti-
trust and unfair trade laws. The current tempest raised by the pipeline
sanctions should not prompt a broadening of the mandate to other
"extraterritorial" legislation such as export controls and securities
laws, for several reasons. First, numerous unresolved substantive is-
sues peculiar to antitrust law are not present under the other laws.
Second, the United States and foreign antitrust interests and policies
differ sufficiently from the national policies and interests underlying
export controls and other laws so that it is highly questionable
whether a single operable jurisdictional rule can be formulated.2 28
228. See Commission on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
Act: Hearings on S. 432 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 58-59 (1981) (statement of Kingman Brewster):
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Third, broadening the mandate probably would result in inattention
to many of the significant antitrust issues because of time constraints
and the interests and expertise of the commission members. Simply
put, enough needs to be done in the antitrust field by a hard-working
commission without saddling its members with the task of rewriting
all of international law.
The priority which our national interest urges will differ in each instance.
The conflicting interests of other States which must be dealt with will also
be quite different in the case of export control or antiboycott legislation than
they will be in antitrust. I think it is illusory to hope that a single jurisdic-
tional rule can be found which will cover all.
The Justice Department in 1981 opposed S. 432 on the ground that its mandate
covered only antitrust and not other "extraterritorial" legislation. See id. at 35
(statement of William F. Baxter, Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice).
